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SUMMARY 
The United States Corps of Engineers (USACE) has been the primary Construction 
Agent of the United States Army and Air Force. Its members are considered the experts in 
project delivery for the Department of Defense (DoD). In 2006, the Base Realignment and 
Closure Program (BRAC) and the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT) led to increased 
workload which caused the USACE to adopt the Design-Build project delivery process as 
a primary means of project delivery in an effort to leverage the method’s ability to deliver 
projects at a lower cost and faster delivery time as compared to conventional methods. The 
focused use of the Design-Build process was to become the primary business practice of 
USACE after the BRAC/GWOT period, replacing the traditional Design-Bid-Build 
process that had dominated the USACE landscape for 50 years. The USACE Commander’s 
intent behind the Design-Build incorporation was to realize a 15% cost savings and a 30% 
reduction in delivery time over the traditional method. This measure of success would serve 
as a guide to the USACE for future business practices. 
Military Construction Transformation, or MILCON Transformation, was the name 
designated to the Design-Build process when it was approved as the primary form of 
project delivery in the USACE in 2006. Since then, the four-year spike in project workload 
brought about during the BRAC and initial GWOT period has been diminished, and the 
business practice has taken some time to incorporate refinements based on lessons learned 
during the BRAC/GWOT period. In 2009 the Engineer Inspector General (EIG) was 
commissioned to measure the performance standards given by the USACE Commander, 
but after conducting only interviews of district chiefs across the USACE, the EIG was 
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unable to quantify any project data that was relatable to the Commander’s metric (EIG, 
2009). Independent studies evaluating the performance of Design-Build in various domains 
of the public sector have been conducted in the past, however a measurement of this 
specificity has yet to be conducted.  
The scope of this thesis is to evaluate the MILCON Transformation performance 
of the of the South Atlantic Division during 2002-2014. Project data was gathered from the 
USACE-internal automated information system, Enterprise Data Warehouse (EDW). Only 
MILCON, vertical construction project data was collected from EDW, and four hypothesis 
based off cost and time were developed for testing. Five project milestones for 304 projects 
that qualified for evaluation were evaluated using 180 separate Welch’s T-tests to test for 
a statistically significant difference between Design-Bid-Build and Design-Build. Of the 
180 T-tests conducted, 37 were in support of the alternate hypothesis, which stated that 
there was a statistically significant difference with 95% confidence between the two project 
delivery models.  
Projects were analyzed in three different ways. First, projects were distributed 
between the two project delivery populations and all performance metrics regarding cost 
and time were analyzed from the Division level. Next, projects were analyzed by building 
type, to find out if there were any specific types of buildings where Design-Build 
performed better than Design-Bid-Build. Finally, projects were analyzed by District, where 
projects from each of the 5 Districts within the South Atlantic Division were analyzed to 
determine if any one District executed Design-Build more successfully than another 
District.  From this analysis, it was found that the 15% reduction of cost by use of Design-
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Build was realized from a Division level. However, in no circumstance was the target 30% 
reduction in time realized for the Division, any District, or any specific building type.  
Results were then  presented to a focus group of leaders within the USACE South 
Atlantic Division to gather insight on why the USACE Commanders goals were not 
completely met. Since literature pointed to Design-Build as being a source of lower cost 
and time in the public sector, data results warranted further insight as to why the USACE 
struggled to gain full value from the Design-Build delivery model. The focus group 
validated the data and findings while attributing discovered performance metrics to 
operational tempo, manpower, and conservative management.  From these results, the 
researcher submits recommendations on how the USACE can realize greater value from 






CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 
Military Construction (MILCON) projects have fluctuated in amount over the past 
15 years due to the Congressionally mandated Base Realignment and Closure, the 
reduction of the Global War on Terror (GWOT), and the completion of the United States 
Army’s Force Re-alignment.  However, at more than six billion dollars of congressional 
funding, it tends to show that the amount of demand is growing (Bloomberg, 2014). The 
United States Corps of Engineers (USACE) is tasked to provide professional construction 
procurement services to the United States Army, Air Force, and any other Federal Agency 
that requests design and construction services. USACE enacted a program called Military 
Transformation in the beginning of 2006, a program that was intended to refocus the 
USACE business model to becoming more Design-Build oriented. Part of this 
transformation was to develop Model Requests for Proposals (RFP) in Centers of 
Standardization throughout various USACE Districts. These RFP’s communicated 
baseline USACE standards that were meant to be performance-oriented in their 
specifications. The purpose for turning towards this business model was to explore the 
different options the private commercial market could give the USACE through allowing 
design-builders the flexibility to define value (Tyler, 2006). Prior to MILCON 
Transformation, the USACE South Atlantic Division (SAD) experienced a project cost of 
$52 Million and an average contract growth of 3%. With the GWOT and the BRAC 
mandate, a change was necessary to give Districts the flexibility to keep project efficiency 
to at an optimal level. MILCON Transformation was expected to reduce project cost by 
fifteen percent and reduce project delivery time by thirty percent while meeting additional 
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Federal design requirements (Temple, 2006). The examination of MILCON projects within 
the South Atlantic Division of USACE will be able to provide insight into whether or not 
the intent of MILCON Transformation was met. 
1.1 The United States Corps of Engineers 
1.1.1 Overview 
 The Department of Defense (DoD) employs the USACE as the primary 
construction agent to be responsible for the development of military infrastructure. The 
USACE primarily finds their customers in the United States Army and Air Force however 
can be requested by outside governmental agencies such as NASA and the National Parks 
Service. While the USACE has the responsibility of providing services for major Civil 
Works such as maintaining waterways and basins within the United States, it has roots in 
Military Construction. The USACE is divided into 9 divisions and 45 districts, each 
responsible for their own geographic area and the Civil Works and MILCON projects 
within those areas.  
The districts are organized in a military fashion, with each district having a 
commander and a chain of command that flows to the lowest levels. Each district is 
commanded by either a Lieutenant Colonel or full Colonel, who is responsible for 
everything that occurs within the district. From there the district is broken down to a 
civilian and military chain of command which helps manage the professional civilian 
augmentation to the district. The Deputy Commander is the military portion of that split 
which controls the administrative functions of the district such as logistics and personnel. 
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The civilian is a General Schedule Fifteen (GS-15) Deputy District Engineer who is 
responsible for the operations, or projects of the district.  
Each district at the USACE has different specified missions, but generally their scope 
falls in Civil Works (water ways, infrastructure), Emergency Relief, Military Construction 
and Regulation. Civil Works has been the primary function of the USACE since its 
development, but MILCON remains a constant focus. The districts are staffed based off 
the type of work they conduct and the workload. 
Each district is broken up into several functional divisions on the operational side 
that help delineate tasks and responsibilities within the district. These areas include 
engineering and construction, program management, contracting, real estate management, 
resource management and information management. Each division has a “Chief” which is 
a GS-15. Each division is kept separate from the other, with closely correlating entities 
such as Engineering and Construction kept separate.   
The engineering division incorporates all disciplines of engineers with all 
professional service personnel licensed through the states in which the district operates. 
Architects are assigned to the Engineering section in order to facilitate internal design of 
projects and to conduct design reviews of contracted work. Every type of engineer and 
architect can be inserted into a PDT as needed to work under the direction of a project 
manager, however they answer to the Chief of Engineering. This format of personnel 
accountability holds true for every division within a district. 
No district is staffed the same, with personnel hired in accordance with their mission 
need. For example, within the South Atlantic Division, the Jacksonville District is set up 
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to accommodate their focus on Civil Works projects. This is in stark contrast to the 
Savannah District who has a large MILCON effort to complement their Civil Works 
campaign focused on the Savannah River. 
 USACE is set up to be a “one-stop shop” for all potential customers. Each district is 
already responsible for their geographical area, but many districts are also the Center of 
Standardization (CoS) for the USACE as a whole. For example, if the Los Angeles District 
accepts responsibility to work on a hospital at Ft. Irwin, they will incorporate a member 
from the Medical Expertise CoS in Huntsville, Alabama into their Project Delivery Team 
in order to bring the specialized expertise necessary and the standardized structure design 
to the project. Another example would be that if any district wants to construct a new base 
family housing complex, the Savannah District CoS would be consulted to provide design 
specifications for that project. Each CoS has specific model RFP’s for their respective 
building type which can be sent to a District, and together with the CoS expert, the project-
owning district can deliver the building in a more streamlined fashion.  
1.1.2 The South Atlantic Division 
The South Atlantic Division is headquartered in Atlanta, Georgia and supervises the 
operations of its five assigned districts; located in Savannah, Mobile, Jacksonville, 
Charleston, and Wilmington. Each district has their own area of geographic responsibility 
that includes both Civil Works and MILCON projects.  No one district is structured and 
staffed the same, with each tailoring their personnel to meet the challenges specific to their 
region. For purposes of this study, the Jacksonville District was omitted due to their lack 
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of a sustained MILCON program. The four other Districts contributed to the Division 
MILCON program in varying, but sustained degrees. 
The Savannah District is the largest district and has the widest mission set within the 
South Atlantic Division. Civil Works missions include the oversight and maintenance of 
three major dams and lakes, the Savannah Harbor, multiple levee’s and wetlands. Their 
MILCON program is equally as robust, facilitating construction operations of 10 bases, 
including Fort Benning, Fort Bragg, Fort Stewart, and Dobbins Air Force Base (AFB). 
With this region of responsibility that incorporates a large military need, the Savannah 
District represents one of the largest MILCON project loads in the USACE. The Savannah 
District is also the Center of Standardization (CoS) for family housing, headquarters, and 
support infrastructure for brigades, battalions, and companies. This standardization can be 
found throughout all Army units that have had both new construction and renovation over 
the past 15 years. 
The Mobile District is equally as diverse as their sister Savannah, but have a smaller 
concentration of a MILCON program. Focused on providing hydroelectric power at eight 
different locations and managing five main river systems and basins, Mobile’s MILCON 
program pales in comparison to their Civil Works effort. However, the MILCON program 
is substantially diverse, manning remote project offices on 15 different military bases.  
Charleston is focused on Civil Works, with numerous efforts focused on the 
Charleston Harbor as well as flood and hurricane mitigation. However, the Charleston 
District does provide MILCON project support primarily to Fort Jackson, a large training 
base located outside Columbia, South Carolina. They also provide MILCON support to 
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four other locations, enabling the construction of necessary infrastructure from barracks to 
headquarters for tenant units. 
The Wilmington District can be closely associated with its sister Charleston when 
focusing its Civil Works efforts on flood and hurricane management as well as the 
numerous ports along the coastline of its geographic responsibility. Wilmington’s 
MILCON program has grown since 2007 when the South Atlantic Commander focused 
Wilmington on providing MILCON services to the Special Operations Command at Fort 
Bragg, North Carolina. The district has overseen the growth of Special Operations 
infrastructure throughout the course of the past ten years and continues to maintain the 
Military Ocean Terminal Sunny Point, which is the United States Army’s primary deep 
water port along the east coast.  
1.2 Base Realignment and Closure 
Since 1988 the United States Government has directed 5 separate BRAC analysis 
from the Department of Defense (DoD). Until the 2001 directive, the previous four had 
been responsible for the closing of 97 major domestic bases and 235 minor installation 
closures or realignments with 55 major base realignments (Ewing, 2006). The United 
States Army began to conduct an internal analysis of capacity based off the 2001 directive 
and prepared recommendations for the BRAC 2005 Congressional Commission. 95% of 
the Army’s recommendations were received by the commission and by November of 2005 
the recommendations were signed into law with a completion date of October 2011. The 
Army’s piece of BRAC was expected to see of $1.5 billion of reoccurring savings and 
began to reshuffle brigades across the continental United States (Ewing, 2006). The 
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USACE, being the construction agent for the Army and Air Force was placed in charge of 
overseeing the various renovations and closures of military bases and camps across the 
United States. This task ran concurrently with the outbreak of the GWOT as their 
construction task included not just the BRAC mission, but enabling the United States Army 
for war. Staffing for USACE remained generally the same, and as a means to cope with the 
increased workload, MILCON Transformation was put into place. Until BRAC’s 
completion in 2011, USACE was executing projects at speeds that had previously been 
unrecognizable due to the shifted primary focus on schedule and mission completion that 
MILCON Transformation brought. 
1.3 USACE Project Delivery Models  
1.3.1 Design-Bid-Build 
The Design-Bid-Build (DBB) method is considered to be one of the oldest forms 
of project delivery. DBB is the most commonly used delivery method for construction in 
both the public and private sectors. Commonly, the owner will contract with an architect 
or an Architect and Engineer (A&E) firm in order to develop the project through the design 
process. Generally, the A&E firm will walk the owner through several critical design 
phases including programming, schematic design, design development, and construction 
documents with owners approval after each step required in order for the firm to continue 
design. Once the construction documents are completed and approved, they are assimilated 
into a bid package and presented to contractors who are interested in completing the work. 
General contractors will come back to the owner with pricing bids based on the design 
package and one will be selected, generally through the lowest responsive and responsible 
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bid. Contractors, just like the A&E firm will enter into a separate contract with the owner 
in an agreement to complete a project for a specific period of time, cost, and quality. 
Generally the architect will assist the owner throughout construction in order to answer any 
Requests For Information (RFI) that the contractor might have. In order to keep the project 
on time and on budget, an owner may also hire a Construction Manager in order to 
represent him throughout matters in the design and construction phase, and to vet decision 
points that need the owners input or guidance (CMAA, 2010). 
 There are numerous ways to procure services during a DBB administered project, 
however, in the public sector, particularly with the USACE, a firm-fixed price is generally 
the more common approach. There are however other procurement possibilities as outlined 
in Part 32 of the FAR which lists choices from incentive-based contracting to lump-sum 
bidding. The USACE generally sticks to firm-fixed price due to its extensive understanding 
throughout all public sector agencies, however in some Design-Build contracts they will 
assume an incentive contract. 
1.3.2 Design-Build 
Design-Build (DB) became regulated for public sector construction in 1996 with the 
Clinger-Cohen Act.  The project delivery method attempts to bridge the communication 
and knowledge gap between architect and contractor by bidding them as one firm. The firm 
is under a single contract with the owner that facilitates a simplified work flow and gives 
a single touch-point for the owner to communicate with during project delivery. This 
delivery system harkens back to the Master-Builder concept of old, where a single 
individual was skilled enough to create, build, and manage construction of a structure. 
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However, with facilities much more advanced than previous years, it takes a specialized 
team that the DB firm brings to the competition table in order to reduce cost and time to a 
minimum. This reduction of cost and time, which has been well researched to support the 
reduction claim (Molenaar, 1998; Webster, 1997; Roth, 1995; Konchar, 1998) has only 
recently been approved by the federal government as an alternate project delivery method. 
While being conceptualized as early as the 1970’s, design-build was not approved by the 
federal government until 1996 after heavily scrutinized testing and specific authorizations 
from Congress, and it was not until later when the military began to incorporate it into 
service-regulation in effort to curtail rising cost and scheduling issues. 
1.3.3 Adapt-Build 
Adapt-Build is a USACE variation of Design-Build. Adapt-Build is taken from  the 
private sector’s Design-Build variation of Bridging  (Project, 2010). The process is driven 
by the model RFP which is developed for each type of building type the USACE has to 
deliver. These model RFP’s are primarily designed to schematics and are written with 
predominately performance specifications. These are developed in-house by the 
engineering division within a Center of Standardization (CoS). They are refined as 
requirements change and post-project recommendations are made. Adapt-Build is 
performance specification oriented for site development work while having prescriptive 
specifications for the actual facilities (Project, 2010). Adapt-Build is used for applicable 
buildings which need to be produced in larger amounts, such as barracks, dining facilities 
and family housing. 
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As part of the “One door to the Corps” approach, each District has the ability to 
reach out to the applicable CoS that is in charge of maintaining a model RFP for the 
building type needed to be procured. The CoS generally provides the model RFP and 
necessary technical support. This allows for the PDT to be adequately staffed with the 
appropriate personnel, thus allowing the programming process to be streamlined. 
Once a model RFP is amended to support the installation design plan, a request for 
qualifications are sent out to prospective contractors. From the respondents, a shortlist is 
made, following the two-step procurement process that is outlined in the FAR. From there, 
an RFP is sent to the contractors on the shortlist. 
1.3.4 Centers of Standardization 
Part of the MILCON Transformation effort was to create Centers of Standardization 
(CoS) into already existing Districts. These CoS would develop and maintain model RFP’s 
for specific building types. In the South Atlantic Division, only two Districts acted as CoS. 
Table 1 below outlines the responsibilities of the Savannah and Mobile District CoS. 
Districts/CoS are charged to develop and maintain model RFP’s, Building 
Information Modelling (BIM) and other drawings in effort to continue to refine and 
develop the RFP’s. The intent is to find an appropriate balance between the performance 
and prescriptive specifications. The designs are intended to accommodate the owners 
standard of façade that is outlined in the base design plan.  
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Table 1: Center of Standardization Responsibilities within the South Atlantic Division 
Savannah CoS Mobile CoS 
Company Operations Facility Aviation – Vertical Construction 
Tactical Equipment Maintenance Four-Star HQ Facilities 
Brigade Operations Complex  
Brigade/Battalion HQ Administrative  
Command/Control Corps HQ  
Deployment Facility  
1.4 MILCON Transformation 
USACE business practices adapted in 2006 as they moved from the Traditional DBB 
to a DB primary project delivery model in effort to save time and money. BRAC 2005 and 
Army restructuring were a major influencer for this change, however the introduction of 
the DB centric MILCON Transformation was intended to endure past the BRAC and 
GWOT mission period.  MILCON had up until that point had heavy reliance on the DBB 
project delivery method, and the USACE was not experiencing much cost and budgeting 
success with using it (Tyler, 2006). As a result, the concept of MILCON Transformation 
was introduced, in which the USACE commander at the time had stipulated some criteria 
for success. According to the USACE, MILCON Transformation would be considered 
successful if costs were reduced by 15% and there would be an average of 30% time 
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savings realized (Tyler, 2006). There were to be no compromises on procurement or 
construction requirements, such as Small Business involvement, LEED requirements, or 
Anti-Terrorism/Base Security requirements because these were unavoidable standards that 
are a part of most Federal projects (Temple 2006, Blomberg 2014).  
Precedent for the use of Design-Build as a more efficient project delivery model had 
been established within the USACE since 1994 and the building of the Sparkman Center 
in Huntsville, Alabama (Setzer, 1993). However, despite the USACE’s success in 
delivering an efficient project, multiple protests from losing-bid contractors influenced the 
USACE to shelve any ideas for DB being a primary project delivery model.  DB would 
then be used only under careful planning and scrutiny. When MILCON Transformation 
was being tested, five different projects were completed during the fiscal year 2006 that 
indicated that DB was a project delivery method to endorse as a primary business model 
(Tyler, 2006). Successes across the nation, on bases such as Forts Campbell, Knox, Riley, 
Carson, and Bliss indicated that DB would bring 15% cost savings within 100% scope 
(Tyler, 2006). These projects included a diverse range of building types, from barracks to 
headquarters and dining facilities. Lessons learned from this study of projects were then 
used to define the expected success of MILCON Transformation.   
 To assist in achieving the cost and time goals, USACE created several 
administrative and system controls. Systematically, USACE introduced their CoS and 
model RFP for standardized building types. This changed the format in which project scope 
was communicated to the bidder. Administratively, USACE published ER 1180-1-9, which 
provided a standardized set of evaluation criteria to PDT leaders in order to help them 
navigate DB contractor selection. The criteria laid out in ER 1180-1-9 serves not just as 
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selection justification, but also helps the PDT leader navigate the complex environment of 
completely defined customer requirements, project size and complexity, quality 
requirements and time constraints. The regulation dictates a mandatory market analysis 
that takes into account the capabilities and experience of the potential contractors to ensure 
there are qualified bidders available to handle the DB work. Finally, the PDT leader is 
guided through FAR 36.301 which lists out the DB contractor procurement criteria 
(ER1180, 2012). 
 With the advent of the CoS and Model RFP, USACE began a divergence away 
from prescriptive specifications to performance specifications. This process hinged on the 
Adapt-Build project delivery method, where the in-house design team of USACE defines 
the initial scope with a design ranging from 10-70% completion which is communicated 
through the model RFP.  This was meant to allow contractors more flexibility to conduct 
value engineering during their design collaboration. USACE, not just the South Atlantic 
Division also incorporated the use of the International Building Code (IBC) and several 
other commercial standards, to encourage the performance specification intent that the 
USACE is trying to achieve through MILCON Transformation.  
 Since implementation of MILCON Transformation, the USACE has gone through 
the BRAC, which was a holistic approach at altering military infrastructure to meet the 
demands of the Army going through an organizational change during a time of war. The 
use of MILCON Transformation and it’s Adapt-Build project delivery process made it 
possible to keep up with the demand of new infrastructure development and renovations. 
The purpose of this study is to quantify USACE project data to confirm that the USACE 
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Commanders intent of MILCON Transformation has been met, with a 15% reduction of 
project cost and a 30% reduction in project delivery time.   
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CHAPTER 2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.1 History of Public Sector Procurement  
2.1.1 Pre-World War II  
From the beginning of the United States until 1933 the Federal Government was 
largely dependent on private funding to finance governmental infrastructure. The United 
States Government (USG) developed a Dual Track Strategy towards project procurement 
to accomplish both military and civilian infrastructure requirements between USG and 
private sector construction assets. 
The USG was financially strained due to routine wars in its fledgling history and 
the lack of ability to procure outside financial help from friendly governments forced the 
USG to exercise extreme financial responsibility. Infrastructure that was deemed routine 
was placed on Track 1 largely due to their being generally well understood, which made 
for certain successful project delivery. New industrial and transportation capabilities that 
were necessary for the westward development of the nation was largely financed through 
partnerships with private entrepreneurs who had interest in the westward growth. Project 
delivery models such as Build-Operate-Transfer (BOT) and Design-Build-Operate (DBO) 
were the vehicles for the USG to develop the construction and transportation infrastructure 
that was necessary for the country to deal with its rapid expansion. Steel bridges, canals, 
and ferry services that were constructed under the franchises of BOT and DBO laid the 
foundation of the telegraph and transcontinental railroad success (Dobbin, 1994). 
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Figure 1: US Dual Track Strategy (Pietroforte, 2002) 
As the success of these delivery models was proven, the private franchises were given more 
latitude to expand as newer technology developed, thus ushering in a rapidly developing 
infrastructure with the emergence of water power dams. Since USACE was positioned at 
the time as the USG primary construction agent, they provided the government oversight 
of all waterway improvements and dam operations.  
Professionalism of the separate construction entities at the time was also beginning 
to take hold, with architecture and engineering services forming their own separate 
organizations to set trade standards and the builders unionizing. Rapid construction and 
governmental backing of private franchises had set the tone for specialized professions to 
develop standards of practice within their community and hold each other accountable. 
Furthermore, the government began validating these standards by issuing licenses that were 
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based off standards set by the professionals. This was largely due to issues seen in and 
around 1875 where there were over 20 cases a year of bridges and dams failing due to 
faulty design occurring (Pietroforte, 2002). Unions became a mainstay in American culture 
pre-World War II due to the proliferation of construction related safety and man-hour 
issues. Men who had grown up in the builder section of the construction system began to 
focus on their own quality of life and safety standards.  
2.1.2 Post-World War II  
The economic situation in America post-World War II was ripe for American 
veterans returning home. President Franklin Roosevelt had set the conditions through his 
New Deal concept to establish federal procurement regulations for the governmental 
agencies such as the General Services Administration he had set up. Federal control over 
government construction started becoming a reality with the 1947 Armed Services 
Procurement Act and the 1949 Federal Property and Administration Act. The latter 
provided federal construction agents such as USACE and GSA to use methods such as 
DBB over the then traditional BOT or DBO. This act only encouraged architects and 
engineers to establish themselves in their niche and begin competing for the federal dollars 
which had begun to flow through municipal governments due to the Federalization that had 
taken place in the United States during the 1950’s (Pietroforte, 2002). 
2.2 Legislation 
2.2.1 The Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) 
The Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) was developed by the Federal 
Procurement Policy Act of 1974 and serves as the regulation for all Federal entities that 
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required contractual services from the private sector. The FAR was developed and is 
maintained by the Secretary of Defense, the Administrator of the General Services 
Administration and the Administrator of the National Aeronautics and Space 
Administration. The FAR derives its authority from Public Law 93-400 and outlines in six 
subchapters and 53 parts how to procure contracted services from the private sector. The 
FAR can have additional regulation added to it that is specific to the Federal organization 
doing the contractual procurement. For example, USACE has their own USACE 
Acquisition Instruction (UAI) and Engineering Federal Acquisition Regulation 
Supplement (EFARS) that supplements the FAR and provides additional contractual 
guidance to USACE employees. Generally, these policies cannot be circumvented except 
by going under an extreme request for exemption process. For construction agents, the 
original version of the FAR only allowed for the DBB method to be used for all 
construction projects. This was attributed to the project delivery method’s perceived ability 
to set conditions for a competitive and transparent bidding process.  
A major change was authorized to the FAR through the Clinger-Cohen Act of 1996. 
Before the Clinger-Cohen Act, Congress allowed both the United States Army and Navy 
to select three projects each out of their MILCON project list per year with the intent to 
use the DB method in 1985 (Roth, 1995). This set conditions for Congress authorizing less 
than 10 projects annually for the DB method in the Department of Defense for the next 10 
years leading up to the Clinger-Cohen Act (Loulakis, 2003).  
This reform included significant additions to the FAR to include Part 36 of the FAR 
which added in the DB method as an authorized project delivery model for construction 
agents to utilize and redacted the limited use of DB. This method was authorized under two 
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procurement methods, a one-phase and a two-phase method. The one-phase method allows 
for a construction agent to receive bids from Design-Build contractors without price as a 
competitive factor. From there, a construction agent makes a determination of which 
proposal to accept based off qualifications and design. The two-phase method allows a 
construction agent to send out a Request for Proposal (RFP) to all potential contractors. 
From the responses, a construction agent can make a shortlist of desired contractors and 
send back out a request for bid. Bids are then sent in by the contractors to the government 
construction agent, an DB contractor is selected, and a project moves into execution.  
2.2.2 The 1972 Brooks Architect and Engineer Act 
As the architecture and engineering professions became more formalized, and work 
became more available, it started becoming apparent that a low-bid process of procurement 
was not always conducive to finding the best design. Since the beginning of public sector 
procurement, selection of architect services had been largely based on good faith with the 
understanding that a franchises or architects reputation was behind the price, and that an 
architect’s experience was reflected in that reputation. While markets developed and 
opportunities for employment increased, it became more apparent to the USG that more 
refinements were needed to the public sector procurement process. Safety concerns derived 
from catastrophic collapses in other countries highlighted the importance of government 
standards getting ahead of the potential problems with low bid and formalizing a 
Qualifications Based Selection (QBS) for public construction agents (Stone, 2012). The 
Brooks Act would set conditions for the use of Design-Build in federal regulation 20 years 
later. 
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2.2.3 The Competition in Contracting Act 
From 1975 to 1984 Litton Industries executed over 45 contracts for the US Military 
in which they were found to defraud the USG out of $6.3 Million (Smith, 1986). Instances 
such as Litton Industries and the “Pentagon Catalog” which advertised diagrams of military 
hardware such as hammers being sold at $435 dollars. Screws, bolts, any item that could 
go into a greater material that was procured through contract was grossly overpriced and 
justifications of price were that such materials were exclusive and specialized. The authors 
of the Pentagon Catalog, Christopher Cerf and Henry Beard stated that the success of Litton 
Industries was attributed to the lack of competitive bidding, lack of fiscal accountability by 
the government (Smith, 1986). 
 The scandals resulted in a refinement to the QBS that the Brooks Act defined. 
Passed into law in 1984, it served as the basis for the soon to come FAR, enacted by the 
GSA and DoD entities in April of the same year. The intent of the Competition in 
Contracting Act (CICA) was to ensure that competitive bidding took place with all federal 
procurement in effort to reduce costs and open opportunities for small businesses to win 
government contracts. Competition advocates are personnel in each federal construction 
agency tasked with reviewing and challenging any anti-competition methods. Single 
Award Task Order Contracts (SATOC), which do not govern MILCON projects are 
excluded from the CICA, while the Multiple Award Task Order Contract (MATOC) which 




2.3 Military Construction and the USACE Project Management Business Process  
2.3.1 Military Construction (MILCON) 
MILCON is a type of public sector construction where military units construct new 
facilities at a value of $750,000 or more. The MILCON business process is depicted in 
Figure 2 below. Generally taking around eight years, it is a lengthy process focused around 
ensuring congressional appropriations and completing the design/construction process. 
The process of acquiring the funds through congressional appropriation can sometimes 
take up to two years after the initial planning charrette and initial DA Form 1391 which 
initiates a project. Once the funds are procured, the USACE is notified via a Directorate of 
Public Works (DPW), which acts as the base commanders representative and represents 
the users of the facility to be built. Throughout the design and construction process, 
USACE acts as the construction agent for the garrison commander and his DPW 
representative. The process and interaction is supposed to promote collaboration and 
teamwork, both with the Owner/User (Garrison Commander), the Design Team, 
Contractors, and the USACE PDT (Project, 2010). 
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Figure 2: The MILCON Business Process (Project, 2010) 
2.3.2 Project Management Business Process (PMBP) 
The USACE PMBP is the outline by which MILCON projects are executed. 
Arranged by a series of flowcharts, each hub in the flowchart is defined as a process which 
has it’s own series of steps in order to complete the process step. Applying to “the planning, 
development and management of programs as well as projects” it is used at all program 
levels within USACE (Project, 2010). The PMBP as it stands today began to take shape as 
early as 1939 with Congress authorizing the USACE to contract for A/E services. Over the 
next 60 years, the USACE business practice was largely shaped by Federal Law, however 
in 1992 the USACE began to codify its practices through internal regulation. ER 5-7-1 was 
the initial Program and Project Management regulation designed to guide the USACE 
employees through the project delivery process. This was not revamped until 2001 when 
ER 5-1-11 became available as well as the implementation of Project Management Plans 
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(PMP’s). Finally, ER 5-1-11 was updated in November of 2006 to reflect the 
implementation of MILCON Transformation. The subsequent PMBP that followed was to 
align the USACE business practices with the Project Management Body of Knowledge 
(PMBOK) issued by the Project Management Institute (Project, 2010). 
 The PMBP goals are to maintain open communication between the customer 
(owner/user) and contractors while keeping the user in mind. The PDT is completely 
tailorable to fit the specific project by custom fitting an assortment of specialists, 
consultants and other governmental liaisons to ensure project success. Led by a Project 
Manager, the USACE’s vision of PDT’s and the PMBP is to “never forget that the finished 
product of our efforts is the delivery of a complete and usable facility to our military family 
on time and within budget” (Project, 2010). 
Figure 3 below is an adapted outline of the Project Delivery Process, as outlined by 
the PMBP.  It’s primary purpose is to streamline the project delivery process and bring 
consistency to USACE’s business practices. There are process procedures for every 
milestone within the delivery process which warrants specific actions by the Project 
Manager and the PDT. This ensures that due diligence is performed among all levels of 




Figure 3: The USACE Project Delivery Process (PMBP, 2009) 
2.4 Current Studies in Public Sector Design-Build Procurement 
2.4.1 MILCON Cost Premiums 
2012 and the advent of a new Congress led the members of the Congressional body 
to investigate the assumption that construction costs were still rising for MILCON 
programs. In 2011 it was assumed that out of the $30 billion spent on federal construction, 
40% of it was spent on MILCON programs (Blomberg, 2014). Following the 
Congressional lead, a study was launched, which was directed at Air Force procurement 
processes. While the Air Force accounts for a smaller percentage of all MILCON programs, 
it’s primary construction agent, USACE is one of four mandated agents that the military 
can use according to DoD Directive 4270.5. 
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 Previous to the study into MILCON premiums in the Air Force, there had been 
several other analyses done by both the House Armed Services Committee and private 
entities (Pope, 1990). The 112th Congress found that there was a 25% to 40% cost 
difference between MILCON cost when comparing like-facility construction with the 
private sector (112th Congress, 2011). The reasons between the differences between the 
sectors generally vary greatly, with attention being focused on regulations imposed by the 
Federal Acquisition Regulation or internal, self-imposed regulation that military 
construction agents adhere to such as the EFARS or UAI. The added regulation, while 
necessary to ensure that USACE and other construction agents maintain fair competition 
amongst potential bidders, can force the construction agent into a form of linear thinking. 
This has been reflected through the study in Air Force projects where the USACE PMBP 
would push Design-Build Contractors to agree to a schedule and cost within two months, 
while it is generally understood for that agreement to take anywhere between eight months 
to a year (Blomberg, 2014). 
 The case-study examined the impact of different construction agent regulation by 
conducting an analysis of two identical hangars built in Alaska by different construction 
agents. The goal was to identify, if cost was higher for either construction agent and the 
reasons for the difference in final cost. One hangar utilized USACE as an Construction 
agent, and the other utilized U.S. General Services Administration (GSA) schedule and 
procurement techniques. The structure that the utilized the GSA scheduling and DB 
techniques ended up costing 27% less than the one that USACE procured (Blomberg, 
2014). Both structures were programmed with the same amount of money, scope and 
timeline. Differences between the two can be demonstrated in two examples. First was an 
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issue with quality requirements for flooring. The GSA scope building allowed for expert 
opinion to allow for a cheaper alternative that met the performance specifications for the 
flooring. However, USACE scope building prescribed specific standards for the floors, 
driving up cost and labor hours. Secondly, the differences between the RFP’s, Scopes of 
Work, and contractor administrative requirements was shown through the 161 total pages 
for the GSA building while USACE had over 1,000 total pages (Blomberg, 2014). Further 
investigation through surveys of contractors indicated that USACE was more stringent 
through their requirements, an opinion which ranked number one out of six possible 
rankings of contract requirement differences between the GSA and the USACE (Blomberg, 
2014). 
 Final conclusions from the study indicated that a federal construction agent will 
generally partner with a private contractor through a contract only, and not actively 
participate in problem solving (Blomberg, 2014). The shift in business practices between 
DBB and DB only shifts risk completely from the construction agent to the contractor, 
instead of finding a middle ground to share the risk. Issues with committing to a fixed price 
too early, such as with the Alaska District of USACE, resulted in a higher cost and turned 
a longer schedule than originally intended. Therefore, the issue of true collaboration may 
be a characteristic of an individual district, rather than a consideration of USACE as a 
complete entity.  
2.4.2 The Penn State Study (Konchar, 1997) 
Konchar’s study of project delivery methods were limited to the three most widely 
used methods in the United States at the time of study. Project performance data was 
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gathered from 351 United States building projects in both the public and private sector that 
would evaluate factors of cost, time, and quality in a univariate and multivariate 
comparison. The study collected, checked, and validated industry data, and was one of the 
first to use multivariate linear regression models to predict average project performance. 
Konchar conducted significance testing using almost 100 variables to explain the 
relationship between cost, schedule and quality performance. Furthermore, comparisons 
between delivery systems and different facility type were investigated (Konchar, 1997). 
 Research was sponsored by the Construction Industry Institute and was divided into 
four phases. Phase one consisted of developing performance metrics and data collection 
instruments. Konchar’s key metrics have become the standard used in studies today, such 
as Unit Cost, Cost Growth, Intensity, Construction Speed and Schedule Growth. Quality 
was measured using an qualitative analysis, by sending surveys out to Owners who would 
rate their satisfaction of their building’s performance. Phase two was the collection of data 
where 7,600 surveys were sent with a response rate of 5.1% (Konchar, 1997). This made 
for 301 usable projects once the responses were vetted for projects that fit the scope of the 
study. Phase three and four were the data scrubbing and analysis portions of the study with 
sample t-tests for means and Mood’s median test being used to combine data samples. The 
results of these tests confirmed that the data was statistically similar, indicating that 
comparisons were valid. 
 Distribution of the three project delivery models were unbiased towards any 
specific delivery system with 23% of projects being CMAR, 33% traditional, and 44% 
design-build. Initial Univariate cost and schedule results can be seen in the table below. 
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Table 2: Median Scores for 351 Projects by Project Delivery System (Konchar, 1997) 
 
From Table 2, Design-Build and CMAR has surpassed the Traditional method by all 
metrics. This suggests that by having a Contractor involved early, as the DB and CMAR 
methods do, the probability for lower cost and scheduling growth rise. To confirm this 
hypothesis, Konchar conducted multivariate regression analysis to develop three models 
that would explain cost, construction speed, and delivery speed.  
 Table 3 below outlines the results of the multivariate linear regression that 
evaluated the project delivery systems. By considering data from every variables data 
points in this research, regression adjusted direct project delivery comparisons. Konchar 
extrapolated five models, three representing primary results based on unit cost, 
construction speed, and delivery speed. The remaining two were cost and schedule growth 
which represented areas of less certainty. The first three columns summarize the results of 
the models, while the fourth column displays the percentage of variation explained in the 
model.  
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Table 3: Difference between Project Delivery Systems by Metric (Konchar, 1997) 
 
Konchar’s research is beneficial to Owners by displaying a project delivery models 
strength in successfully delivering a project under budget and scheduled completion time. 
Project attributes as well as cost, time and quality considerations for project delivery 
models for specific faculties can act as guidelines for Owners to follow when developing 
their project management plan. 
2.4.3 Public Sector Design-Build Evolution and Performance 
The private sector has a greater amount of latitude for project procurement than the 
public sector. The FAR allocates strict rules in place for federal entities to conduct project 
delivery. After the Federal Acquisition Reform Act of 1996, only the Traditional and DB 
project delivery methods are authorized for use at the Federal level of government (FAR, 
1996). This limits Federal agencies for project delivery options, and places responsibility 
on those agencies to be good stewards of governmental funds while maintaining a climate 
for open competition. 
The validation of DB as being a more effective project delivery method than DBB 
for the Public Sector was the topic of several studies in the 1990’s (Webster, 1999, Roth, 
1995, Gordon, 1994, Konchar, 1998). Quantifying the markets reception towards a new 
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way of conducting governmental project delivery was crucial to ensure that there were 
enough private firms available who understood the DB process and could make a bidding 
process competitive. A study from the University of Colorado-Boulder measured the 
advantages and disadvantages of the One-Step, Two-Step and Qualifications Based DB 
Methods which highlighted the changes that the 1996 Federal Acquisition Reform Act put 
into place with the authorization of federal construction agents to utilize the DB method 
(Molenaar, 1999). 
The study of the different selection methods was based on 104 public sector projects 
that used the DB method. Projects, as well as participating governmental agencies ranged 
from the federal, state to local level (Molenaar, 1999). Figure 4 below displays the project 
performance data for the DB method in the public sector. Based on those projects, 59% 
were within 2% of the budget that was established when the DB firm was hired while 77% 
of the projects were within 2% of the established schedule. These metrics are given that 
73% of the DB firms that were hired were at 25% or less of the completed design (Molenaar 
1999). 
 
Figure 4: Design/Build Project Performance (Molenaar, 1999) 
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While the DB method has shown that it can be beneficial to adopt, it has resistance 
within the public sector. Aside from the project delivery method being shown to be more 
efficient than the traditional method, several public owners, who were experienced in DB, 
indicated in interviews that the early pre-design and design phases are more difficult than 
the traditional method (Molenaar, 1995). This could be an indicator with the public sectors 
familiarity with prescriptive specifications rather than being comfortable with performance 
specifications. DB generally forces an Owner to lean more towards the use of Performance 
Specifications, which allow the Contractor to give more input on saving cost by finding 
cost-effective quality substitutions. This fundamental change from the Traditional method, 
which uses almost all Prescriptive Specifications, that has defined the public sector’s 
business method for the past few decades (Molenaar, 1999). Figure 5 below outlines the 
type of specifications that were noted throughout the study. 
 
Figure 5: Type of Specifications (Molenaar, 1999) 
DB has grown in popularity so much to where certain federal public entities such 
as USACE and NAVFAC, have recently began developing their own procedures to 
supplement the DB procurement procedures outlined in the FAR. However, even with this 
popularity growth, a public owners lack of sophistication with the DB method can limit the 
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delivery methods effectiveness with a unrelenting focus prescriptive specifications. This 
study acted as a benchmark for public owners to refer to when developing a procurement 
strategy. The 1996 FARA outlined a 2-step DB method that has been adopted by most 
public entities today. The public sector, despite the additional regulations that govern their 
procedures such as the FAR, can still gain the cost and schedule advantages of DB by 
relying more on performance specifications, contractor expertise, and team collaboration.  
2.4.4 Public Sector Design-Build Procurement Techniques 
The validation of DB as being a more effective project delivery method than DBB 
for the Public Sector was the topic of several studies in the 1990’s. Quantifying the 
market’s reception towards a new way of conducting governmental project delivery was 
crucial to ensure that there were enough private firms available who understood the DB 
process and could make a bidding process competitive. Table 4 below illustrates results 
from a study from the University of Colorado-Boulder measured advantages and 
disadvantages of the One-Step, Two-Step and Qualifications Based DB procurement 
Methods which highlighted the changes that the 1996 Federal Acquisition Reform Act put 
into place with the authorization of federal construction agents to utilize the DB method 
(Molenaar, 1999). 
Qualifications Based Selection was omitted of the table because it is not used by 
USACE. The study of the different selection methods was based on 104 public sector 
completed design build projects with participating agencies ranging from the federal, state 
and local levels (Molenaar, 1999). Based on those projects, 59% were within 2% of the 
budget that was established when the design/build firm was hired while 77% of the projects 
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were within 2% of the established schedule. 73% of the design/build firms in the study 
were hired when the design was at 25% or less of the completed design (Molenaar, 1999). 
Table 4: Advantages and Disadvantages of Design/Build Methods (Molenaar 1999) 
Form of Design/Build Advantages Disadvantages 
One-Step Procurement 
• Allows for award on 
overall value (price and 
technical) 
• Designs that exceed 
minimum specifications 
can be realized 
• Delivers a product that 
most closely conforms 
to the user expectations 
• Burdensome to evaluate 
multiple proposals 
• Greatest chance of 
delays due to protests 
from inadequate 
offerors 
• Costly preparation for 
offerors 
• May require the most 
detail in the RFP, 
placing a burden on the 
owner 
Two-Step Procurement 
• Allows for award on 
overall value (price 
and technical) 
• Allows for short-
listing, saving 
owner and offeror 
time and money 
• Offers a wider range 
of design solutions 
• Delivers the best 
budget and schedule 
performance 
• Technical and 
design review 
process can become 
lengthy 
• Chance of delays 




• If low bid award is 




2.4.5 Model for Public Sector Design-Build Project Selection 
The University of Colorado sponsored a study in 1998 focused on developing a 
predictive model for Design-Build use. This study, based off 122 projects in the public 
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sector, relied heavily on the Federal level for its models with over 75% of its data coming 
from that entity. Using questionnaires as a source of data collection, inputs were compiled 
based off Owners, Designers, and Contractors responses when they were asked to rate 
building construction performance criteria based on a variety of factors. Utilizing 
regression, the study was able to develop a model that could predict the potential for 
success for projects using the DB method. 
 Key results from the study indicate that DB saw high levels of success when first 
used by a construction agent, but did not sustain that success as the entity became more 
familiar with the process (Molenaar, 1998). This confirms Blomberg’s suspicion, based 
upon contractors assertions that the construction agent was pushing too much risk onto the 
Design-Builder by not fully immersing themselves into the design process (Blomberg, 
2014). 
2.4.6 NAVFAC Design-Build Performance 
The United States Navy’s Facility Command (NAVFAC) is the DoD sister of 
USACE that primarily serves the Navy and Marine Corps construction needs much like 
USACE serves the Army and Air Force. NAVFAC operates under the same conditions as 
USACE and conducted an analysis of both DBB and DB within it’s business structure. 
Hale (2009), realized early in the data collection process that it was necessary to narrow 
down the analysis by only taking samples from each project delivery method as they were 
applied to a specific building type. For NAVFAC, the Bachelor Enlisted Quarters (BEQ) 
was chosen as the building type to be studied. BEQ’s are similar to U.S. Army barracks in 
that the facilities are designed essentially the same across branches. Designs are kept 
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generally the same, with only façades being changed based on which base the structure is 
located on. Therefore, the conditions in which the two sample sizes of 39 DBB projects 
and 38 DB projects were generally the same and suitable for an accurate comparison. 
Results of the NAVFAC study were clearly supported by statistical significance for 
performance metrics related to time, but only suggestive when related to cost. Hale (2009) 
acknowledges that the homogeneity of the samples and can only characterize the 
performance in BEQ’s. He continues to say that careful analysis should be made before 
extending these results to other facility types (Hale, 2009). However, due to the close 
homogeneity of design standards between BEQ’s and Army barracks, it is assumed for this 
study that Hale’s study could indicate a savings in time for the USACE efforts in procuring 
barracks for Army bases. 
2.4.7 Design-Build Performance in the United States Air Force 
The United States Air Force’s primary construction agent is USACE, which makes 
Rosner (2009) research into Air Force MILCON projects closely related to this study. For 
his study, a data set of 835 Air Force MILCON projects were analysed to determine the 
best project delivery system. DBB and DB were compared using six different performance 
metrics via one-tail T-Tests. Additionally, a facility type analysis was conducted for nine 
facility types to identify which facility types were best suited for the DB delivery method. 
While the project data was skewed heavily in the favor of DBB with 557 projects, 
DB demonstrated a statistically significant reduction of cost growth and controllable 
change in the 278 projects built under the DB method. It is interesting to note that the DBB 
method outperformed DB for performance metrics related to time. However when Rosner 
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compares his study to historical data, DB is shown to be closing the performance gap that 
DBB currently held (Rosner, 2009). This was shown in cost growth, where DB reduce it’s 
margin from 8.21% in FY 96 to 2.79% in FY 04 (Rosner, 2009). Additional reductions in 
Modifications Amount and Project length in years were realized during the same time 
frames with DB reducing itself by $1.78 Million and 0.84 years (Rosner, 2009). 
Examination of the project performance trends showed that certain facility types 
could set the conditions for a more successful use of either DBB or DB. Using the same 
performance metrics that were used for the overall comparison, Rosner compared the two 
delivery methods for nine different facility types. Of those nine, six facility types were 
found to result in better performance when DB was used as a delivery method. Out of these 
six identified, Operations, Administration, Fitness Centers, and Child Development 
Centers were applicable to the current study. Roser concluded that Maintenance, Storage 
and Dormitory did not seem to favour either method. Air Force Dormitories are closely 
aligned with Army Barracks in terms of design and therefore was also focused on as well 
as the DB preferred four building types for the current study. 
2.4.8 MILCON Transformation Engineer Inspector General Report 
In 2009 the USACE Commander ordered the Engineer Inspector General (EIG) to 
conduct an investigation into MILCON Transformation to see if the original intent had 
been met. The EIG assembled a team of three personnel to conduct interviews and have 
discussions at all levels of USACE command. Four Division Commands, all eight CoS 
Districts and three additional Districts that had MILCON missions but no CoS 
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responsibility were sampled. The purpose of the inspection was to evaluate MILCON 
Transformation from the following objectives: 
• Command-wide understanding and support of MILCON Transformation 
principles 
• Whether MILCON Transformation goals and objectives had been attained 
• Whether Customers have adjusted to the MILCON Transformation process 
(EIG, 2009) 
The EIG team conducted interviews with USACE personnel for nine months and 
at the conclusion the team found no quantifiable evidence that supported the objectives. 
The final report stated that the team could not quantify any cost savings because USACE 
commands had not developed a system to identify and segregate cost that would identify 
successful implementation of the MILCON Transformation process. MILCON 
Transformation schedule completion, which was aimed to overall reduce time by 30% rate 
as compared to the traditional process, also had no system to measure data to support that 
metric. Since then, various automated information systems such as the Electronic 
Database Warehouse have become available making project data more accessible, 
however a study of MILCON Transformation has yet to be completed. 
2.5 Metrics for Evaluating Construction Projects 
The importance of standardizing a project’s performance metrics is important so 
that evaluations can be conducted across the construction market, and not just an 
individual firm or entity. While numerically articulating the perceived success of a project 
through figures relating to cost and time is important, this data is not completely indicative 
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of the reasons for why a project was successful or unsuccessful. Projects that have a 
negative trend in numbers that are less than the original contracted amount are generally 
referred to as successful, while those with inflated metrics are considered unsuccessful. 
However, there are a multitude of reasons why cost and time inflate, and having 
quantifiable data points for each reason is important in developing a standardized 
perception across the professional landscape.  
Project metric types can be classified as relative, static and dynamic (Gransberg, 
2002). Relative metrics allow financiers to evaluate small projects alongside larger 
projects and identify trends in a project management. Static metrics are a product of a 
project’s size in relation to time and cost, and when used for a study need to be compared 
with projects of similar scope. Finally, dynamic metrics are a product of cost versus time 
which numerically articulates a project’s efficiency (Gransberg, 2002). Each metric has 
its own limitations which can be mitigated through the proper application of filters to 
ensure that equal conditions exist between the types of projects being compared. The 
USACE has long used these types of metrics to evaluate project performance which is 
therefore is justification to use them throughout this study (Gransberg, 1999). 
2.6 Problem Statement and Research Questions 
Research into the comparison between DB and DBB is extensive and supports the 
hypothesis that true savings can be achieved in the current market using DB over DBB. 
MILCON Transformation was the business model change that the USACE Commander 
believed was necessary to bring USACE up to current private sector standards and achieve 
new savings. The implementation of MILCON Transformation during the beginning of 
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BRAC was crucial to USACE achieving mission success, while at the same time 
maintaining control of financial resources and time. MILCON Transformation was enacted 
during a time of high operational tempo and was theorized to be able to be tailored to the 
high demands of an army modernizing at a rapid rate. Thus, the focus on a reduction of 
cost and time was important to the USACE Commander so that he could deliver much 
needed buildings to base commanders at a lesser cost and time than DBB was currently 
delivering. To address this problem the following research questions are proposed: 
2.6.1 Cost Savings 
Was the USACE Commander’s intent of 15% reduction in cost by implementing 
MILCON Transformation as an alternative to the traditional DBB project delivery method 
achieved? 
H0: There is no difference in Cost between DB projects and DBB projects. 
H1: There is a lower cost for DB projects than DBB projects. 
2.6.2 Schedule Reduction 
Was the USACE Commander’s intent of generating a 30% time savings by 
implementing MILCON Transformation as an alternative to the traditional DBB project 
delivery method achieved? 
H0: There is no difference in project delivery duration for DB projects in comparison to 
DBB projects. 
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H2: There is a shorter project delivery duration for DB Projects in comparison to DBB 
projects.  
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CHAPTER 3. METHODOLOGY 
The purpose of this study was to answer the questions that were proposed in Chapter 
Two and to quantify the assumptions made in the Engineer Inspector General’s report. To 
help establish and vet performance metrics, a pilot-study was conducted on Barracks-
classified building type projects within the Savannah District. That study established the 
standards and parameters for harvesting, cleaning and analyzing data throughout this thesis. 
From that study, the basis for the investigation into the South Atlantic Division took shape. 
All project data was collected and analyzed at the South Atlantic Division Headquarters in 
Atlanta, Georgia. 
3.1 Research Framework 
This study was developed using the Applied Research Process outlined in Figure 6 
below. Block one was achieved by researching the issues surrounding public sector cost 
and schedule inflation in comparison to the private sector. This led into preliminary data 
gathering where a literature review was conducted on the analysis of the two authorized 
types of project delivery methods in the Federal government.  
Through this review, a gap in knowledge was discovered in USACE’s metrics where 
the measurement of MILCON Transformation had not been quantified and compared 
against project data from the Traditional Method. The investigation into this project data 
as well as past and present USACE business practices helped identify the framework of the 
study. Further reading of the USACE Project Management Business Processes (PMBP) 
shows that the intent of both the DBB and DB Project Delivery Methods is to maximize 
the efficiency of the taxpayer dollar. This indicated that developing hypotheses that were 
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focused on the differences between the two methods are best suited to suggest reasons for 
reductions in cost and time for MILCON projects. Block 6, the Scientific Research and 
Design will be discussed in this Methodology Chapter while the Data Analysis and 
Deduction portions of the Research Process will be discussed in Chapter’s 4 and 5 
respectively. 
  
Figure 6 Applied Research Process (Sekaran, 1992) 
3.2 Data Collection Protocol 
3.2.1 Enterprise Data Warehouse (EDW) 
The primary data gathering tool of this study was the USACE’s Enterprise Data 
Warehouse (EDW). EDW is an automated information system that allows the USACE 
Project Data Managers to gather and quantify project data that meets the Commanders 
reporting needs. EDW pulls its information from several other USACE databases which 
are: 
1. Resident Management System (RMS)- Construction-related information. RMS 
is, “a quality management and contract administration tool that provides an 
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efficient method to plan, manage, and control construction projects” (Project, 
2010). 
2. Program and Project Management Business Process (P2)- project-definition 
and basic financial information. P2 is, “an automated information system (AIS) 
to effectively manage all programs and projects in USACE” (Project, 2010). 
3. Corps of Engineers Financial Management System (CEFMS)- project financial 
data. CEFMS is, “the primary source of financial statements and upward 
reporting requirements necessary to comply with the CFO Act” (Project, 2010). 
It supplies labor data necessary to pay the USACE employees for work 
completed.  
 Project information gathered from EDW is tailorable to the request using project 
milestones which are outlined in the Military Programs Data Dictionary, a USACE-internal 
publication that aids employees in understanding the types of Project Reports, their 
associated Milestones and the associated Codes that communicate project development. 
The project data from EDW can be filtered by every Milestone for every project conducted 
by all Divisions and Districts inside USACE. 
3.2.2 Data Filtering Criteria 
The initial data pull of all MILCON projects resulted in 902 projects meeting the 
initial search criteria within EDW. Initial search criteria was done by MILCON funding 
codes listed in Appendix A. There were no filters for the initial query other than finding all 
projects that were listed as funded under MILCON fund code. This ensured that every 
MILCON project executed in the South Atlantic Division within the 2002-2014 time period 
was found. Filters listed in the forthcoming sections were then applied, leaving 304 
MILCON projects within following filtering parameters for the time period of data 
collection between March and April 2017. The final data field of 304 MILCON projects 
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were solely from the South Atlantic Division between 2002-2014. Only projects that had 
completed data sets for the milestones identified for report selection were used. Completed 
projects were only measured, with completion being considered as construction complete 
with final payments to the contractor made. The histogram in Figure 7 displays the number 
of projects by programmed year during the surveyed period. 
 
Figure 7 Yearly Project Dispersion for Collected Data 
3.2.2.1 Filter by Fund Type 
There are 223 different types of fund codes which correlate to the specific type of 
federal funds that are allocated for types of military programs. They are broken down by 
three business lines, which are categorized as Installation Support, Environmental 
Renovations, and MILCON. There are 115 fund codes associated with the MILCON 
business line. Of these 115, only 22 pertained to projects within the South Atlantic Division 
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3.2.2.2 Filter by “Design By” Data 
There are seven metrics for “Design-By” data which signify how the design was 
developed. The “Design-By” field can have the following data entry points via the EDW 
query: 
• Design-Construct (Design-Build) 
• A&E (Design-Bid-Build) 
• Hired Labor – In House (Design-Bid-Build) 
• DB RFP by In House (Design-Build) 
• DB RFP by A&E (Design-Build) 
• DB RFP by Hired Labor (Design-Build) 
• Adapt-Build (Design-Build) 
Based off of these seven metrics, projects can be have their project delivery method 
categorized as either, “Design-Bid-Build” or “Design-Build”. In order to validate the 
Design-By data, projects were looked at individually in their RMS notes file to see Project 
Manager’s description of the project delivery method.  After this validation, 26 Projects 
had no Design-By data and were purged from the overall data set. 
3.2.2.3 Filter for Incomplete Data 
There were some projects that did not have complete data for every project 
milestone. Projects that had incomplete milestone data were removed from the data set, 
resulting in 487 projects being purged. 
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3.2.2.4 Filter for Vertical Construction 
MILCON can include both horizontal and vertical construction. Horizontal 
construction includes various types of ranges for weapons and vehicles, road construction, 
fencing, airfield paving, environmental retrofits and water treatment systems. Vertical 
construction is any project which primary focus is the construction of a building or group 
of buildings. In order to focus on a more specific type of MILCON that would be amenable 
to a more accurate statistical analysis of facility type, the data pool was filtered for only 
vertical construction. This resulted in 31 projects purged from the data pool. 
3.2.2.5 Filter for Incremental Funding 
Projects were labeled by the designation of a P2 number, which is assigned once a 
project becomes funded. During the GWOT, several bases such as Fort Benning, Fort 
Bragg and Fort Stewart were going under rapid facility expansion in order to house the 
arrival of thousands more Soldiers. Changes in a Tenant units force requirements would 
turn projects that were just for a single barracks expansion into an entire barracks complex. 
To meet this need and to handle the rapidly expanding cost, projects were incrementally 
funded due to requests of funds to Congress being sent whenever the need for an expanded 
project was communicated. Therefore, there were 22 projects with P2 numbers that were 
listed separately in the EDW report, however upon validation of data within RMS, it was 
found that these 22 projects were actually sub-projects of already existing projects in the 
data set. In order to confirm the financial and time data, the researcher totaled the data 
from the sub-projects to ensure the parent project was accurately reflected as a summation 
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of its sub-projects. Once confirmed, the sub-projects were removed from the data set as 
their inclusion would have been redundant due to it’s reflection in it’s parents project data. 
3.2.2.6 Final Impact of Data Filtering 
The result of all above filtering was a total of 599 projects removed from the 
original data set. This filtering allowed for a more reliable data set than what was originally 
obtained from the EDW query. The final project set is comprised of 304 projects over the 
span of 2002-2014 in the South Atlantic Division. This final set resulted in 60% of projects 
being DBB, and 40% being DB.  
 
Figure 8: Impact of Data Filtering 
3.2.3 Time-Value of Money Adjustment 
Since the projects in the data set span over the course of 12 years, it is necessary to 
account for the time-value of money using the Consumer Price Index (CPI) provided by 
the United States Department of Labor. This is used to convert dollar amounts listed for 









projects into constant dollars in another year. For this study, all projects were converted to 
the 2006 CPI, which was when MILCON Transformation was enacted. All cost data was 
adjusted for inflation to prevent a distorted cost analysis that failed to account for the 
changing purchasing power of the dollar (Inflation, 2002). The result of the adjustment is 
shown in the Figure 9 below with projects classified in cost categories to help show the 
scale of projects in the study. Five cost categories are generally accepted across the 
construction industry. The categories are as follows: 
• Micro projects are less than $2 Million  
•  Small Projects are between $2-$10 Million  
• Medium Projects are between $10-$50 Million 
• Large Projects are between $50-$100 Million 
• Mega Projects are above $100 Million 
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3.3 Data Demographics 
The importance of uniformity of data was key in order to produce an accurate display 
of MILCON Transformation effectiveness. Through prejudicial filtering and additional 
validation of data through other USACE internal data systems, the data used is an accurate 
representation of the entire South Atlantic Division MILCON project field. Projects were 
segregated based off their initiated year, size, scope, and delivery method in order to help 
identify any divergent characteristics with any of the segregated criterion. 
 
Figure 10: Project Breakdown by Year and Project Delivery Method  
 Before the study was conducted, the expectation of the researcher was that all 
MILCON projects post-2006 would be conducted DB, either by way of an Adapt-Build 
CoS process or a pure 2-Step DB process. Demographic Analysis shown in Figure 10 
shows this is not the case with 53% of projects being conducted as DBB and 46% of 


















by the USACE Command, it did not fully supplant the DBB process due to the flexibility 
Project Managers in the districts have to execute project management practices.  
 BRAC was expected to have a huge impact on project load. To be able to show the 
added project impact on the South Atlantic Division, projects were given an additional 
classification of being a BRAC-directed project. The impact of BRAC is indicated in the 
Figure 11 below. The added BRAC projects shown by the figure are only indicative of the 
projects that passed through all the filters listed above. The figure shows only the amount 
of BRAC projects within the data set and are not an accurate representation of the entire 
BRAC impact. 
 
Figure 11: Impact of BRAC by Year 
 Projects were categorized by building type after looking at their project description. 
Using the same terminology observed in literature, projects were considered 
“Administrative” if they were a headquarters building for a company, battalion, brigade, 
or division. Maintenance facilities and other like-headquarters offices were considered 

















Soldiers in some capacity. Barracks serve one purpose, to house Soldiers, and there is a 
standard of living within the army that ensures barracks amenities are standardized for 
everyone. Community and Food Service buildings were grouped together due to their 
likeness in size and scope complexity. Buildings identified as Community were Fitness 
Centers, Chapels, Child Development Centers, and Schools. Food Service buildings were 
simply troop dining facilities. Projects that remained were labeled 
“Infrastructure/Warehouse/Training Area”, which was a catch all for projects that did not 
fit the parameters of the first three molds. Training Area projects were projects specifically 
related to vertical construction, such as shoot-houses and urban assault areas, not training 
areas such as rifle and grenade ranges.  
 Projects were finally arranged and evaluated by District. Simply put, projects 
executed by a specific district were categorized as such. The four Districts tested 
contributed to the results of the South Atlantic Division. However, certain Districts showed 
a greater ability to implement DB than others. Therefore, a comparative analysis was 
conducted within each district to investigate specific performance metrics as related to a 
district.   
3.4 Analysis 
3.4.1 Metrics 
Project performance is generally depicted as an analysis of a project’s Cost, Time 
and Quality. Changes in either three fields are what generally govern the measurement of 
each project performance metric, however literature suggests that this kind of legacy 
measurement does not accurately reflect a project’s performance. Performance can be 
broken down by relative, static, and dynamic metrics (Gransberg, 2002). For purposes of 
this study, only relative and dynamic metrics are used. Relative metrics are performance 
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based metrics that allow for various sizes of projects to be compared. They can be applied 
to cost and schedule growth, which will be seen in this study. A complete list of all data 
points pulled in the EDW query can be found in Appendix B. 
3.4.1.1 Contract Growth (Gransberg, 2002) 
 Contract growth is not a new metric, and has been seen throughout studies which 
measure project performance (Gransberg, 2002, Konchar, 1998). The calculation is 
expressed as a percentage and uses a contract’s dollar amount for the equations value. This 
study used the following calculation to express cost growth: 
𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡	𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ =
(𝐹𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑙	𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡	𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡 − 𝑂𝑟𝑖𝑔𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑙	𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡	𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡)
𝑂𝑟𝑖𝑔𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑙	𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡	𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡 ∗ 100 
 
3.4.1.2 Contract Time Growth (Gransberg, 2002) 
 Contract Time Growth, much like its contract growth counterpart is also seen 
throughout many studies in project performance. This calculation is measured in days, and 
uses days to express value. The following calculation was used throughout the study to 




𝐸𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑	𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡	𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒 ∗ 100 
3.4.1.3 Beneficial Occupancy Date (BoD) Time Growth 
 Since USACE projects rely on several different governmental payment 
mechanisms, a project cannot be completely closed out until final payments are made and 
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litigation, if there is any, is completed. However, for the purpose of this study, the 
Beneficial Occupany Date (BoD) time growth will be calculated to be used as a metric for 
project completion. This BoD is reflective of when military personnel are allowed to enter 
a structure and begin operations, which is the actual intent of the build structure. For this 
calculation this study will calculate the difference between BoD Scheduled and BoD 
Actual in days. The following calculation was used throughout the study to calculate BoD 
Time Growth and is expressed as a percentage. 
𝐵𝑜𝐷	𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒	𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ =
(𝐵𝑜𝐷	𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑢𝑎𝑙 − 𝐵𝑜𝐷	𝑆𝑐ℎ𝑒𝑑𝑢𝑙𝑒𝑑)
𝐵𝑜𝐷	𝑆𝑐ℎ𝑒𝑑𝑢𝑙𝑒𝑑 ∗ 100 
3.4.2 Welch’s T-Test 
 A Welch’s T-test is a hypothesis test which determines if two data groups came 
from the same population. The Welch’s T-test, also known as the unequal variance T-test, 
is used when working with small sample sizes or when a researcher wants to err on the side 
of caution when drawing conclusions (Boslaugh, 2012). For this study, the Welch’s T-test 
was assumed appropriate for use due to the small sample sizes tested such as the districts 
of Charleston and Wilmington, and researcher conservatism. If the T-value is greater than 
the probability listed on the t-table for a 95% confidence rating, the null hypothesis was 
rejected. The 95% confidence rating was chosen due to the focused scope of this study and 
to reduce the amount of Type I errors that would be the incorrect rejection of a true null 
hypothesis. The use of the confidence rating is also prevalent in literature (Rosner, 2009) 
and is therefore generally accepted amongst professionals. Errors were mitigated through 
the use of the high confidence rating and the unequal variance T-test. Table 5 below 
outlines the types of statistical errors faced throughout this study. Literature tells us to be 
concerned with a Type I error more than Type II (Miller, 1997).  
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 P-Values are used in data analysis to communicate statistical significance in this 
research. The alpha level that served as the cut off point was 0.05, and for P-Values that 
fell below the alpha level, it was interpreted that the null hypothesis was to be rejected. P-
Values that were greater than 0.05 failed to reject the null hypothesis.  
Table 5:Type I and II error explanation (Miller, 1977) 
 
3.4.3 Qualitative Evaluation 
Validation of findings by a panel of experts is vital to any comparative research. A 
focus group was therefore brought together to whom the researcher presented the purpose, 
methodology and results of the research. A 30 minute background was given on all results 
and background to allow for an hour and a half of discussion. Results of the focus group’s 
input was recorded by hand, as regulation did not allow the use of tape recorders. The 
researcher had an assistant on hand to help take notes and moderate the discussion. 
3.4.3.1 Focus Group Recruitment 
The focus group consisted of three employees within USACE that either had at 
least five years of project management experience, currently was in a project management 
position, or was in a leadership position within the South Atlantic Division. Inclusion 
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criteria was limited to their specific work experience and position within the South Atlantic 
Division. No exclusion criteria was given as all personnel who met the inclusion 
requirements were present at the time of the focus group. Recruitment of the personnel was 
done formally over email and followed up personally. The focus group was conducted at 
the Sam Nunn Federal Building on the ninth floor and lasted for approximately 2 hours. 
3.4.3.2 Discussion Questions 
Discussion questions were developed to guide the focus group members. After a 
short 30 minute presentation on research background, methodology and results, members 
were then posed a single question and given a chance to respond individually and to each 
other. Responses were recorded manually with certain parts omitted due to member 
request. All presented qualitative data was given consent to be used. The questions that 
follow were posed one by one in the order of which they are written: 
• Are the Project Performance results reasonable? Do they make sense? 
• Is there anything specific that’s surprising about the research results? 
• What are the reasons for the performance differences amongst the four districts 
that have MILCON projects sampled? 
• How does the PMBP enable (or vice-versa) the project delivery process? How 
do you think this has affected the performance results? 
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Answers are captured in Chapter 5 and are used to foster discussion and gain insight 
for MILCON Transformation performance displayed in the Data Analysis portion in 
Chapter 4.  
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CHAPTER 4. DATA ANALYSIS 
 Data Analysis for the project data was primarily conducted through the use of the 
Welch’s T-test. For this study, the two groups were initially formed based off similar 
project scope and data size of both Pre-MILCON Transformation and Post-MILCON 
Transformation periods. Rationale was based off the thought that all projects executed prior 
to 2006 were conducted solely with the DBB delivery method and projects executed after 
were conducted using DB. This segregation left only 22 projects that were DBB in the Pre-
MILCON Transformation period against the 282 projects that were in the Post-MILCON 
Transformation period. Having such an unequal population size would skew any sort of 
statistical test and cause either a Type I or Type II error. Furthermore, less than 30 samples 
in either of the populations would jeopardize the central limit theorem, which would 
indicate that the data would not follow a normal distribution. A confidence interval of 95% 
was chosen due to the focused scope of this study and it’s use throughout literature. When 
a higher confidence interval is applied, no performance metric is shown to reject the null 
hypothesis. 
 Based off data demographics it is shown that DBB continued to be used even after 
the implementation of MILCON Transformation in 2006. This disposed of the first notion 
that projects had to be analyzed from a standpoint of Pre MILCON Transformation and 
Post MILCON Transformation. Therefore, considering that MILCON Transformation was 
designed to bring in the DB method into the USACE business practice, it was then therefore 
acceptable to readjust the populations by comparing a pure DBB population to a DB 
population. This resulted in a DBB population of 190 vertical construction projects and a 
DB population of 128 vertical construction projects. The study can test for the USACE 
Commander’s performance metrics with assurance that conditions have been set for the 
USACE staff to meet the projected goals. 
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4.1 Analysis of All South Atlantic Division Projects 
4.1.1 Cost 
 Project data was organized and divided by either being confirmed as DBB or DB. 
Initial tests considered all projects, of all cost and building type. The results of the tests 
intended on validating the Commanders metric of 15% cost reduction by using DB through 
the MILCON Transformation initiative. The T-test analysis tested the following 
hypothesis: 
H0: µDBB = µDB 
H1: µDBB≠ µDB 












Adjusted Original Contract Cost 
(Constant 2006 dollars) $18,539,548.89 $48,858,423.64 0.000 Y 
Adjusted Final Contract Cost 
(Constant 2006 dollars) $19,271,624.64 $49,957,091.62 0.000 Y 
Contract Cost Growth (%) 0.06 0.04 0.027 Y 
Controllable Change (Dollars) $629,085.32 $1,063,372.70 0.293 N 
Final Change (Dollars) $911,314.13 $989,672.99 0.926 N 
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 Based off Table 6, there was significant change seen amongst Contract Cost 
Growth. In this analysis, the DB delivery method realized lower cost growth than DBB by 
34.4%. Furthermore, the Welch’s T-test indicated that this difference between the delivery 
model was statistically significant which verifies that the change in cost growth can be 
attributed to the use of DB. For this analysis, the differences in Contract Cost are not 
important due to the wide range of projects for the overall test.  
 Change Orders did not yield any significant results, however Controllable Changes 
were much higher on average for DB rather than DBB. This could indicate the 
improvement process the USACE undergoes every time they review their model RFP for 
specific building types. Lessons learned by the USACE during a project is driven by the 
dissatisfaction by the Design-Build Contractors interpretation of performance 
specifications, which causes the USACE to ‘refine’ their model RFP post-project and 
become more prescriptive with the specification they were dissatisfied with. The 
controllable changes can also be attributed to Owner’s changing demands as Post-
Commanders (Users) attempt to shape the building to the constant changing demand of a 
military undergoing modernization. 
4.1.2 Time 
 As with the analysis for Cost, time data was organized and divided by either being 
confirmed as DBB or DB. Initial tests considered all projects, of all cost and building type. 
The results of the tests intended on validating the Commanders metric of 30% time 
reduction by using DB through the MILCON Transformation initiative. The T-test analysis 
tested the following hypothesis: 
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H0: µDBB = µDB 
H1: µDBB≠ µDB 








P-Value Reject Null 
Contract Time Overage 
Days 157.46 139.49 0.380 N 
Contract Time Growth (%) 32.34 25.97 0.125 N 
All BoD Growth (Days) 74.99 77.50 0.895 N 
All BoD Growth (%) 12.78 12.99 0.945 N 
Controllable Change (Days) 65.52 69.91 0.699 N 
Final Change (Days) 160.03 150.60 0.626 N 
 Table 7 shows  overall time test results for USACE South Atlantic Division. None 
of the tests indicated any statistically significant differences between DBB or DB. 
However, there was a noticeable decrease in contract time growth with DB producing on 
average an 11.4% reduction on contract time. Interestingly, BoD growth stayed consistent 
for both project delivery models. BoD, however, can be changed based off USACE and 
Owners decision to occupy a building before a project is complete.  
 Change Orders had less of an impact on time than the cost implications of the 
change orders. Controllable change, staying consistent, indicates that project delivery 
methods have little impact on the time it takes to implement a change order. The difference 
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in days added to a project’s time caused by controllable change between project delivery 
methods are within 5 days. This accounts for around 25% of the average schedule decrease 
that DB projects realized for contract time overage. 
4.1.3 Commanders Rollup of Overall South Atlantic Division Performance 
The vision for MILCON Transformation was to achieve the 15% and 30% reduction 
of cost and time, respectively. While those factors can be evaluated through simple math, 
it was necessary to conduct an in-depth statistical analysis in order to attribute the 
fluctuation of differences between populations to either project delivery model. The table 
below is to be treated as a sort of “Commanders Rollup”, designed to combine the simple 
reduction comparison with the statistical analysis.  
The Commanders Cost/Schedule Analysis table focuses on the performance metrics 
that directly relate to the 15% and 30% reduction of cost and time. Considering Table 8 as 
a reference, performance metrics evaluated are listed vertically in the column furthest to 
the left. The following performance metrics were selected because of their direct 
correlation to the cost and time goals of MILCON Transformation: 
• Cost Growth  
• Controllable Change 
• Contract Time Growth (Day) 
• Contract Time Growth (Percentage) 
• BoD Day Growth 
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The top of the chart lists all the data points for the performance metrics. They 
articulate the direct comparison of project delivery models. The column next to the list of 
performance metrics is the column for the DBB averages. The third column are the 
averages for DB. The column labelled “% Change” is the difference between the two 
averages of DBB and DB. To determine the difference, the following equation was applied 
to the mean values for the project delivery methods being compared: 
%	𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒 =
𝐷𝐵	𝐴𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 − 𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑙	𝐴𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒
𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑙	𝐴𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 ∗ 100 
 A negative percentage indicates a reduction in performance metrics favouring the DB 
delivery method. A positive percentage indicates an increase in performance metric 
indicating that the DBB delivery method performed better than DB.  
The column labelled, “P-Value Validation” refers to the P-Value given from the T-
test performed with the project delivery method averages. Any P-value below 0.05 was 
considered statistically significant and was given a “Y” beside the P-Value listed in the 
column. If the P-Value was above 0.05, an “N” was listed beside the P-Value, indicating 
that there was no statistical significance between the two project delivery method 
populations. Finally, the column labelled, “Meets True Commanders Intent” was inserted. 
Values for this column are listed as the following: 
• “Y” – Yes, Meets the MILCON Transformation goal of either 15% reduction 
in cost or 30% reduction in schedule growth. 
• “N” –No, does not meet the MILCON Transformation goal. There can be 
three reasons for a “N” value, either DBB performed better than DB, the P-
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Value did not validate the difference of averages, or the MILCON goal was 
not met outright. 
 To further explain how the table reads, consider the performance metrics in Table 8. 
For cost growth, there is a -34.40 % change between the averages for DBB and DB. This 
negative percentage means the difference is in favour of the DB delivery method. This 
value is also below the 15% cost savings goal of MILCON Transformation. To validate 
this difference of averages, the P-Value was considered. The P-Value, being less than 0.05, 
therefore validates the differences in averages therefore attributing the reduction in cost 
growth to the DB project delivery method. Therefore, in the column “Meets True 
Commanders Intent”, this performance metric is given a, “Y” for Yes, the 15% reduction 
in cost goal of MILCON Transformation was achieved.   Conversely, if the MILCON 
Transformation goal was not met, or if the P-Value did not validate the differences in 
averages, or if the DBB project delivery method performed better, the value for “Meets 
True Commanders Intent” was given an “N”. In parenthesis next to the “N” is a note that 
lists why a performance metric did not meet the commanders intent of MILCON 
Transformation. 
Table 8 below reflect inputs from the statistical analysis in tables in this subchapter. 
First, a simple comparison of means are used to develop a percentage of change. Second, 
that percentage of change is evaluated to see if the DB mean met the USACE Commanders 
metrics. Finally, if met, the statistic is validated through the P-Value, which if lower than 
.05, can attribute the differences in mean to the project delivery model. 
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Table 8: Commanders Roll-up of All SAD Projects from 2002-2014 
Commanders Cost/Schedule Analysis 















Cost Growth 0.06 0.04 -34.40 0.02 (Y) Y 
Controllable 
Change $629,085.32 $1,063,372.70 69.03 0.29 (N) 
N (DB, or MT 
has increased) 
Contract Time 
Growth (Day) 157.46 139.49 -11.41 0.38 (N) 30% goal not met 
Contract Time 
Growth (%) 32.34 25.97 -6.37 0.12 (N) 30% goal not met 
BoD Day 
Growth 74.99 77.50 3.34 0.89 (N) 
N (DB, or MT 
has increased) 
Here we see where Cost Growth has exceeded the expectations of the USACE 
Commanders intent with a 34.4% change in Design-Build’s favor, and with a P-Value of 
.027, it is assumed that this change can be attributed to the project delivery model. 
However, while success was realized with the reduction of Cost Growth, Time Growth did 
not meet intent nor was it validated by the Welch’s T-test. Furthermore, the differences 
between Contract Time Growth and BoD Day Growth indicates how the BoD can be 




4.2 Analysis by Building Type 
Literature indicated that there were six building types that were best suited for the 
DB process. (Rosner, 2009) While the projects in literature were pulled from Air Force 
projects, the facility types were procured by USACE as the acting construction agent, 
which handles those projects much as the same as they do the Army projects. Rosner 
(2009), indicated 6 building types within his research that were conducive to DB success, 
however only Administrative, Fitness Centers, Child Development Centers, and 
Operations buildings relate to this study. Administrative and Operations Facilities relate to 
the Administrative building type category used in this study while Fitness and Child 
Development Centers relate to the Community/Food Service building type. Literature was 
inconclusive about the performance of the barracks building type, which prompted 
investigation in this study. (Rosner, 2009; Hale, 2009; McWhirt, 2007) The barracks type 
used in Hale’s study was BEQ’s delivered by NAVFAC, but are considered relatable by 
nature due to the public sector conditions of NAVFAC and the barracks-centered design 
and intent of the BEQ. Hale (2009) and McWhirt (2007) both indicated that barracks were 
indicators of successful DB performance while Rosner’s investigation was inconclusive 
with neither the DBB or DB method being favored.  
The projects were grouped based off a building type, which identified a single project 
as part of a single group. Projects were grouped by their project title in the P2 program. 
Out of the seven types of groups, only three had enough data to support adequate population 
sizes for the T-test. Figure 12 outlines the project demographic based off building type: 
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Figure 12: Project Dispersion by Building Type 
 The intent behind breaking down projects into building type groups is to identify 
where the use of DB made a type of project perform more efficiently than its counterparts 
that used DBB. Project data was organized into separate populations by their project 
delivery type of either DBB or DB Building type tests considered only projects of that 
specific building type, and of all cost-sizes. The results of the tests intended on validating 
the Commanders metric of 15% cost reduction and 30% time reduction by using DB 
through the MILCON Transformation initiative. The T-test analysis tested the following 
hypothesis: 
H0: µDBB = µDB 
H1: µDBB≠ µDB 
4.2.1 Administrative Building Type 
 DB had the greatest impact on the Administrative building type in this study. 






Administrative Barracks Community/Food	Service I/W/TA
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Battalions, Brigades, or higher echelons of units. Examples of the project labels in P2 were, 
“SOF (Special Operations Forces) BN & CO Operations Building” and “Unit Operations 
Facility”.    
Table 9: Commanders Roll-up of Administrative SAD Projects  
Commanders Cost/Schedule Analysis 















Cost Growth 0.07 0.04 -43.23 0.03 (Y) Y 
Controllable 
Change $701,207.66 $1,520,076.95 116.78 0.29 (N) 
N (DB, or MT has 
increased) 
Contract Time 
Growth (Day) 169.79 123.06 -27.52 0.11 (N) 30% goal not met 
Contract Time 
Growth (%) 34.81 21.87 12.94 0.01 (Y) 30% goal not met 
BoD Day 
Growth 72.86 78.22 7.36 0.83 (N) 
N (DB, or MT has 
increased) 
 Table 9 above indicates a 43% reduction in cost when using the DB Method over 
the DBB method when applied to Administrative buildings. However, there is a large 
increase in controllable change. This  could indicate owner or USACE dissatisfaction with 
design standards that the contractor used when building a facility. Since controllable 
changes are owner or USACE initiated, it suggests that the changes are attributed to 
changing owner needs or design dissatisfaction. For administrative building types, there 
are building specifications that support rapidly developing technology requirements. This 
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increase in controllable change could indicate that dynamic where USACE initiated a 
change in order to keep up with the technological developments. Cost savings is still 
realized, but the drastic reduction in cost growth with DB is tempered with a large increase 
in controllable change. However, despite the tempered results of cost performance, the time 
growth almost achieved the USACE Commanders intent with an almost 13% reduction in 
Contract Time Growth Percentage that was validated with a P-Value that was less than .05. 
While this does not meet the 30% expectation, this was the only time performance metric 
within specific building types that was validated with a P-Value less than .05. 
4.2.2 Barracks Building Type 
Barracks have been constructed using DB for longer than any other USACE project. 
Additionally, literature has shown that Barracks generally perform well under DB as 
opposed to any other building type (McWhirt, 2007). However, for the barracks data in the 
South Atlantic Division, this was not found to be the case. Table 10 below indicates that 
DBB performed just as well if not better then DB. While no metrics were validated by T-
tests, means of project delivery populations point to this similarity in performance. 
The difference between project delivery model performance for barracks in the South 
Atlantic Division was nominal. While there were differences in the performance metrics, 
P-Values given through T-test of sample populations were so high that performance would 
have been the same no matter which project delivery model was used. Contract Time in 
days was reduced drastically by almost 22%, however, with a P-Value of .35 there was no 
way that that reduction can be attributed to DB. 
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Table 10: Commanders Roll-up of Barracks SAD Projects  
Commanders Cost/Schedule Analysis 















Cost Growth 0.02 0.03 40.65 0.48 (N) N (DB, or MT has increased) 
Controllable 





Growth (Day) 198.26 155.29 -21.67 0.35 (N) 
30% goal not 
met 
Contract Time 
Growth (%) 29.51 26.47 3.03 0.71 (N) 
30% goal not 
met 
BoD Day 
Growth 60.84 92.25 51.62 0.55 (N) 
N (DB, or MT 
has increased) 
4.2.3 Community and Food Service Building Type 
The last building type to be evaluated were the community and food service buildings. 
Just as seen with the barracks, community and food service buildings indicated that a 
pattern of equal performance between the two project delivery models. Table 11 below 
shows that the cost growth values for both delivery models were relatively the same while 
time performance differences were within 2% of each other. Controllable change is 
lowered for the community and food service building types, however no statistical 
significance was found to attribute that change to the delivery model. 
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Table 11: Commanders Roll-up of Community/Food Service SAD Projects  
Commanders Cost/Schedule Analysis 















Cost Growth 0.05 0.05 9.28 0.95 (N) N (DB, or MT has increased) 
Controllable 
Change $295,619.01 $204,252.27 -30.91 0.40 (N) 
N (Not Validated 
by T-Test) 
Contract Time 
Growth (Day) 106.53 123.75 16.17 0.44 (N) 
N (DB, or MT 
has increased) 
Contract Time 
Growth (%) 21.65 22.74 -1.10 0.80 (N) 
N (DB, or MT 
has increased) 
BoD Day 
Growth 45.71 54.06 18.28 0.68 (N) 
N (DB, or MT 
has increased) 
Both project delivery models perform near the same for the community and food service 
building type. Differences in cost growth are measured by thousandths of a decimal. BoD 
growth, while increased, further insinuates that its metric may not be reliable due to user-
Commander influence on when a move-in date can be arranged.  
4.3 Analysis by District 
Each individual District had their own metrics, which can give a good indicator of 
performance by region. This can also indicate how each District contributes towards the 
overall performance of the South Atlantic Division’s implementation of MILCON 
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Transformation. Projects were grouped by District, as assigned in the P2 program. Out of 
the South Atlantic Division’s five Districts, only four were used. Jacksonville District was 
omitted due to none of its projects passing through the filters. Figure 13 shows the breakout 
of projects by District. 
 
Figure 13: Amount of Projects by District 
Savannah has a long history of providing construction services to some of the largest 
bases in the United States. Fort Benning, Fort Bragg, and Fort Stewart are the largest bases 
in the military, and all fall under the Savannah District’s geographical responsibility. The 
Mobile District, which is second largest, serves predominately Air Force Bases with its 
MILCON program, however, it also provides construction assistance to several Alabama 
and Florida National Guard facilities. Wilmington, whose MILCON program became more 
robust in 2007, primarily services Special Operations Forces in Fort Bragg in order to help 
alleviate some responsibility from its sister Savannah. Finally, Charleston focuses 
219,	72%
64, 21% 
7, 2% 14, 5% 
Project	Dispersion	by	District
Savannah Mobile Charleston Wilmington
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primarily on Fort Jackson, however like its sister Mobile, has several other Air Force and 
National Guard facilities to provide its expertise to.  
 The intent behind breaking down projects by District is to identify which District 
experienced the most success using DB.  Project data was organized into separate 
populations by their project delivery type of either DBB or DB by District. District tests 
considered only projects of that specific District, and of all cost-sizes. The results of the 
tests intended on validating the Commanders metric of 15% cost reduction and 30% time 
reduction by using DB through the MILCON Transformation initiative. The T-test analysis 
tested the following hypothesis: 
H0: µDBB = µDB 
H1: µDBB≠ µDB 
4.3.1 Savannah District 
The Savannah District has one of the more robust MILCON programs in the South 
Atlantic Division, as well as USACE as a whole. The researcher conducted a pilot study 
focused on Savannah that shaped expectations prior to this study. This focused analysis on 
22 DB and 15 DBB barracks projects within the Savannah District’s determined that the 
two delivery models performed equally (Westcott, 2017). This study widened the aperture 
of the study to all Savannah projects conducted between 2002 and 2014. Table 12 below 
accounts for these projects. All projects represented fell into all cost categories. While DB 
did not achieve the USACE Commander’s intent for any performance metric, this could be 
in part to the extreme workload the District had which in turn limits a Districts staff to fully 
collaborate with the DB process and reap the recognized benefits of the delivery system. 
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Table 12: Commanders Roll-up of Savannah District Projects 
Commanders Cost/Schedule Analysis 




















Change $528,961.07 $1,102,093.22 108.35 0.22 (N) 
N (DB, or MT 
has increased) 
Contract Time 
Growth (Day) 124.08 131.88 6.29 0.70 (N) 
N (DB, or MT 
has increased) 
Contract Time 
Growth (%) 22.53 24.00 -1.47 0.64 (N) 
N (DB, or MT 
has increased) 
BoD Day 
Growth 56.07 77.43 38.09 0.24 (N) 
N (DB, or MT 
has increased) 
Indicated from the table above, Savannah saw sufficient reduction in their cost 
growth, however with a P-Value above the Confidence Interval of .05, the reduction 
couldn’t be attributed to the switch in delivery systems. However, the other performance 
metrics for time did not fall in favor of DB, as DBB performed as well if not better than 
DB. The District had a large majority of the project and workload, which would tend to 
reason that they had the greatest chance of gaining familiarity with the DB delivery model 
at a faster rate. Instead, DB seemed to perform worse as the years went on as displayed in 
Table 12.  
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4.3.2 Mobile District 
The Mobile District had the second largest amount of projects and came the closest 
to achieving the USACE Commanders intent through their implementation of MILCON 
Transformation. Most of the Mobile Districts projects were categorized as the 
Administration building type, which in turn helped that building types overall performance. 
This could be an indicator that Mobile and its contractors understood the DB project 
delivery method and had enough time to maximize it’s effectiveness through constant 
collaboration.  
The Mobile District successfully achieved and surpassed the USACE 
Commander’s intent of 15% cost reduction while maintaining a moderately close 
comparison of controllable change in relation to the rest of the districts. Performance 
metrics for time also suggest that DB helped achieve a drastic reduction in time, but this 
was not validated through the use of a T-test.  The Mobile Districts success with DB could 
be a result of the sophistication and time available to the staff which is a dynamic not seen 






Table 13: Commanders Roll-up of Mobile District Projects 
Commanders Cost/Schedule Analysis 




















Change $944,503.01 $1,118,519.54 18.42 0.86 (N) 
N (DB, or MT 
has increased) 
Contract Time 















4.3.3 Charleston District 
The Charleston District has the smallest project portfolio of the four districts measured for 
MILCON Transformation. Generally staffed for their Civil Works mission, their MILCON 
program is small-staffed and isn’t exercised often. Charleston Districts performance 
metrics are shown in Table 14. 
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Table 14: Commanders Roll-up of Charleston District Projects 
Commanders Cost/Schedule Analysis 















Cost Growth 0.07 0.09 35.35 0.67 (N) N (DB, or MT has increased) 
Controllable 
Change $524,624.94 $1,370,838.27 161.30 0.49 (N) 
N (DB, or MT 
has increased) 
Contract Time 
Growth (Day) 122.75 374.00 204.68 0.09 (N) 
N (DB, or MT 
has increased) 
Contract Time 
Growth (%) 32.59 74.47 -41.88 0.22 (N) 
N (DB, or MT 
has increased) 
BoD Day 
Growth 127.50 88.33 -30.72 0.73 (N) 
N (Not Validated 
by T-test) 
Charleston’s cost performance increased dramatically as DB was compared to 
DBB. The population sets between the two project delivery model were almost 
symmetrical, which suggests an accurate statistical analysis was done when the Welch’s 
T-test was conducted. All of Charleston’s performance metrics were heavily lopsided in 
favor of DBB. This could be an indicator of either the USACE or local contractors 




4.3.4 Wilmington District 
The Wilmington District was brought into a heavy MILCON role in 2007 when the 
then South Atlantic Division Commander had the District act as a construction agent for 
the Special Operations Forces (SOF) at Fort Bragg, North Carolina. Originally focused on 
their Civil Works mission, Wilmington was brought in to take on the SOF projects to help 
alleviate the project management burden of Savannah during the BRAC period. 
Table 15: Commanders Roll-up of Wilmington District Projects 
Commanders Cost/Schedule Analysis 















Cost Growth 0.08 0.02 -75.70 0.20 (N) N (Not Validated by T-test) 
Controllable 
Change $82,902.01 $134,643.98 62.41 0.57 (N) 
N (DB, or MT has 
increased) 
Contract Time 
Growth (Day) 182.13 85.83 -52.87 0.12 (N) 
N (Not Validated 
by T-test) 
Contract Time 
Growth (%) 37.99 16.98 21.01 0.03 (Y) 30% goal not met 
BoD Day 
Growth 153.25 62.00 -59.54 0.44 (N) 
N (Not Validated 
by T-test) 
Wilmington displayed a strong preference to DB through their 14 projects. Six of the 
projects were DB and all 14 of the projects being in the Small-Medium price range and 
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categorized as either administrative or training area buildings. However, even with the DB 
means of both Cost Growth and Contract Time Growth being substantially lower than 
DBB, the p-values were not low enough to constitute being considered statistically 
significant at .20 and .12 for both cost and time respectively. 
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CHAPTER 5. CONCLUSIONS 
The study regarding project delivery methodology in the South Atlantic Division was 
initiated by a pilot study in MILCON Transformation for the Savannah District earlier in 
the year. Project data indicated that there was still a preference to use the DBB method 
instead of the DB method even after the USACE Commanders decision to move to DB as 
the primary method of project delivery was made. The pool of data cannot be considered 
as an analysis of the entire range of delivery methods for MILCON projects due to the fact 
that the majority of projects were filtered out due to insufficient data. Therefore, this study 
only evaluates those projects that were completely entered into their respective automated 
information systems at the time of data collection between March 2017 to April 2017. 
MILCON Transformation placed an emphasis on the use of DB, however its use was 
not mandatory. Initially, it was assumed that the overwhelming majority of projects Post 
MILCON Transformation would be conducted using the DB delivery method. However, 
project managers within USACE are given the authority to recommend the delivery method 
that best suits the project need at the time of a planning charrette being conducted.  
District results are an indicator of how MILCON Transformation affected project 
performance metrics. MILCON Transformation was more than a change in project delivery 
methods, it sought to change a culture within USACE of being conservative and 
prescriptive. USACE is a highly complex organization, and it is impossible to attribute 
project performance metrics to a single project delivery method. Each district has a project 
management staff that varies in personality and culture from district to district. This has a 
direct impact on how well projects are managed within a district, not just how well a project 
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delivery method is executed. A Project Delivery Team’s members are also members of 
other PDT’s and performance performing multiple additional duties for the district. For the 
smaller Districts, this dynamic can be a huge factor for personnel acting in a MILCON 
project manager role that’s more familiar dealing with Civil Works projects. Therefore, the 
results of this study indicate how well MILCON projects performed in a complex 
organization through the implementation of MILCON Transformation. Results suggest that 
a change to the Design-Build delivery method works better in certain districts rather than 
others. The study does not offer definitive reasons for both delivery methods project 
performance data. The quantitative portion of this study only states what the performance 
metrics were based off the data available in USACE’s EDW at the time of collection. The 
focus group’s comments are antidotal and suggest reasons for the differences in project 
performance metrics amongst the two delivery systems studied.  
5.1 Conclusions to Research Questions  
5.1.1 Cost Savings 
MILCON Transformation was intended on enabling USACE to realize a cost 
savings of 15%. Therefore the question was asked, “Did the USACE Commander’s intent 
of 15% reduction in cost by implementing MILCON Transformation as an alternative to 
the traditional DBB project delivery method achieved?” The data analysis for the South 
Atlantic Division showed that the 15% reduction of cost goal was achieved. This 
achievement is a result of the average of all the districts within the division. When each 
district is analysed separately, Mobile and Wilmington are found to have successfully 
attained the 15% reduction of cost as a result of MILCON Transformation implementation. 
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Savannah saw a decrease in cost growth as well, but the data analysis revealed that there 
was no statistical significance between the project delivery methods used, indicating that 
the results were by chance, not by MILCON Transformation implementation. Charleston 
had completely different results, with DBB greatly outperforming DB in cost performance 
metrics.  
The cost growth project performance metric fluctuated depending on which 
building type was constructed. This suggests that a single project delivery method cannot 
be considered a ‘one-size-fits-all’ solution. The data for the administrative type suggests 
that the greatest potential for cost savings can be realized if the administrative building 
type is executed DB. The barracks building type seemed to be a good fit for the Design-
Build delivery method because it has standardized performance metrics through its CoS. 
However, data indicates that the project delivery method had no impact on cost growth. 
This is surprising because barracks are built frequently and are less complex than other 
buildings that USACE generally has to deliver.  Community and food service projects 
experienced the same results as barracks, which was also surprising because they share a 
similar dynamic with the barracks building type of being often repeated. 
5.1.2 Schedule Reduction 
MILCON Transformation was intended to bring a 30% reduction in project delivery 
time. Consequently, the question was asked, “Was the USACE Commander’s intent of 
generating a 30% schedule reduction by implementing MILCON Transformation as an 
alternative to the traditional DBB project delivery method achieved?” From the data 
collected and analysed, none of the statistical tests showed that the South Atlantic Division 
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achieved that goal. The districts showed the same results in their individual analyses on 
project schedule performance metrics. Mobile and Wilmington almost met the 30% 
schedule reduction goal. Their project time performance metrics were lowered by 15%-
20%, with statistical tests indicating the reduction in time was a result of using the Design-
Build delivery method. Savannah demonstrated that there was no savings in time when 
using either delivery method. Charleston demonstrated to have an uncomfortable 
relationship with DB as its project time performance metrics were strongly in favor of the 
DBB delivery method. 
The time analysis conducted by building type failed to show any real preference to 
delivery system with no test yielding a statistically significant finding. While the 
administrative building type came close with realizing a 27% reduction in construction 
time and a low P-value, it could not be concluded that the 30% goal was positively met. 
While the tests for building types showed slightly lower BoD rates and contract growth 
rates, it could not be categorized as being statistically significant.  
The Beneficial Occupancy Date (BoD) is a metric that can be adjusted based off 
several factors. BoD is the date that Soldiers occupy a building for use, regardless if a 
project is completed or not. This date can be adjusted based off a Commanders need, 
building importance, or a project completing early. For this study, BoD dates remained 
generally the same amongst project delivery methods. This dynamic allowed BoD to be 
shifted based off a buildings ability to meet the desired function, even though that might 
not mean completion. Therefore, the building was able to meet commanders even though 
a project was not completed.  
 83 
5.2 External Validation of Results 
An external examination of project data and results was conducted by a focus group 
of three USACE South Atlantic Division personnel. The intent of the focus group was to 
hypothesize reasons for MILCON Transformation results. Opinions expressed are antidotal 
comments from participants and are not complete explanations for the results of MILCON 
Transformation. USACE is a complex organization and a project’s execution relies on a 
number of additional factors outside the use and execution of a project delivery method.  
The following four questions were used to spur discussion and to gain insight: 
• (Question 1) Are the Project Performance results reasonable? Do they make 
sense? 
• (Question 2) Is there anything specific that’s surprising about the research 
results? 
• (Question 3) What are the reasons for the performance differences amongst the 
four districts that have MILCON projects sampled? 
• (Question 4) How does the PMBP enable (or vice-versa) the project delivery 
process? How do you think this has affected the performance results? 
5.2.1 Question 1 responses 
The project performance metrics were agreed upon to be acceptable for the study. 
There were no issues with the methodology or analysis done. The general consensus was 
that the results were not surprising and that they made sense.  
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5.2.2 Question 2 responses 
Overall there were no surprises. The focus group acknowledged that the rate of 
projects drastically increased during the 2006-2010 time period due to BRAC and the 
increase in GWOT base infrastructure. Another reason was that while the rates of projects 
drastically increased, staff to help manage the projects did not increase. PDT’s were having 
to handle double, sometimes triple the amount of work they were accustomed to seeing. 
Additionally, there was no real focus on two of the three “Time-Cost-Quality” triad. Initial 
guidance of MILCON Transformation was to focus on time (Project, 2010). Turning 
projects around within 18-24 months meant that USACE was keeping up with the needs of 
a growing military while meeting the GWOT and BRAC requirements. However, as 
contractor solution to performance specifications became known, USACE personnel 
developed quality concerns.  
To highlight this point the focus group gave the example of the barracks building 
type, which was an area of surprise for most focus group personnel. According to literature, 
barracks executed under the DB model were expected to outperform DBB with statistical 
significance (Hale, 2009). However, the barracks studied here showed such results. To 
highlight this as a reason, the issue was that barracks were needing to be constructed 
efficiently and quickly. A model RFP was developed and used to solicit proposals. 
However, the Design-Build contractors’ designs tended to be considered unsatisfactory due 
to lowered quality in Design-Build designs when compared to previous Design-Bid-Build 
projects. Simply put, project delivery teams were reluctant to approve Barracks 
demonstrating lower quality than what had been accomplished in the past. This triggered 
design changes, and amendments to the model RFP’s, which translated into prescriptive 
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specifications, which are exactly what DB tries to steer away from. This could have 
compromised the MILCON Transformation process. Contractors generally would require 
higher cost premiums because an expectation was set that schedules would become 
extended due to the design change. 
5.2.3 Question 3 responses 
The focus group could only speculate as to why the districts performed differently. 
There was a wide range of issues from program managers’ preference, to contractor 
sophistication to owner/user involvement. The focus group mirrored Brigadier General 
Merdith Temple’s comments from 2009 he said that the number of projects increased while 
the amount of staff available either stayed the same or lessened (Project, 2010). Each 
district and the division headquarters were allowed to hire the personnel necessary to 
complete the spike of projects from 2006-2010. Some districts chose to do more with the 
capacity they had while other districts and headquarters staff chose to augment with 
contracted employees to address the increased workload. 
Prior to the focus group, the expectation of the researcher was that each district 
stayed within their geographic area of responsibility and rarely shared workloads amongst 
each other. For the Mobile District, this is true because they service a specific niche and 
are geographically isolated from the rest of the South Atlantic Division. However, the focus 
group indicated that this dynamic was not always the case. For instance, Savannah provides 
much needed technical assistance and expertise to Wilmington, Charleston and 
Jacksonville. While Jacksonville does not execute many MILCON projects, they are 
without a MILCON-specific division within the district and therefore rely on Savannah for 
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project management and technical support. Charleston operates in the same way as 
Jacksonville but their requests to Savannah are more frequent and cumbersome, with 
Savannah technical personnel being requested to fill out Charleston PDT’s in order to 
maximize internal knowledge and capacity. 
Wilmington shares perhaps the most intricate and interesting relationship with 
Savannah, as they could be viewed as supporting Savannah, not vice versa. Since taking 
on Special Operations Forces projects from Savannah, Wilmington shares a resident office 
at Fort Bragg with Savannah. Wilmington, like Charleston, still needs technical assistance 
from Savannah in order to augment their PDT’s, however it is easier for Wilmington to 
cross-pollinate talent from Savannah while sharing a resident office. Wilmington generally 
retains the PM and contracting authority while they receive engineering augmentation from 
Savannah. This relationship, while unorthodox, has proven to be a viable solution based 
upon the results of this study. 
5.2.4 Question 4 responses 
Unexpectedly, the focus group suggested that the PMBP did not have a considerable 
impact on the project delivery process the researcher had expected. Instead, the PMBP was 
suggested to give the procedural framework in which to work within the USACE and 
federal business system. How a project manager chose to operate within the architecture 
was up to the project manager alone. The PMBP is known as a type of checklist, full of 
procedures that are laid out for a project manager to execute in linear fashion. It also knits 
the right people and assets together to set conditions for a good PDT to become assembled. 
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One member put it another way, the PMBP codifies all the actions that a good project 
manager would do anyway.  
The difference in performance of the DB delivery system between what was found 
in this study as opposed to what was seen in literature was first attributed to an 
organizational structure issue. A PDT’s structure was covered in Chapter 1, however the 
dynamic of the structure was revealed in the focus group. The PMBP states that a project 
manager has overall responsibility for a project, and the members of the PDT can range 
across a host of architects, engineers, environmental experts and contracting agents. The 
project manager is in charge of the PDT in theory, but the organizational structure does not 
give the project manger the ability to officially task his team members with any 
responsibility.  
As previously discussed in Chapter 1, the divisions within USACE districts were 
specifically divided based off function, such as construction, engineering, program 
management, etc. Each division within the District has a Chief who manages all employees 
assigned to the division. PDT members are pulled from a variety of these divisions, and 
the division chief, not the project manager, retains control of the team member’s work. 
There are Chiefs of Construction, Engineering, and Project Mangers. The Deputy Director 
of Project Management (DDPM) acts as the Chief of Project Managers and can also act for 
the District Commander if decision making authority is delegated to him via the District 
Commander. The DDPM is a GS-15, as well as all the other division chiefs. This means 
that there is an equal amount of authority amongst chiefs which makes for a gridlock of 
tasking authority amongst team members. To put it another way, a HVAC engineer on a 
PDT may get guidance from the PM to conduct a design review, however if the Chief of 
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Engineering wants him to prioritize that design review last, then the HVAC engineer will 
take the Chief’s direction over the PM. This can cause for an adverse relationship within a 
District when things go wrong which can delay projects even longer as internal processes 
are sorted out. Each District Commander has the ultimate tasking authority, but the support 
structure that allows him to execute these multiple and minute tasks is not conducive for 
efficient results. This dynamic makes risk management for project managers difficult when 
they have no direct authority over team members to act on specific project tasks.  
Most technical skilled personnel in USACE Districts are in short supply and are 
tasked to a multitude of projects. The focus group indicated that a single engineer on a PDT 
could also be on 6 other PDT’s which could be a mixture of Civil Works or MILCON 
projects. This dynamic validates the division chief’s roles in defining priorities for their 
personnel, but takes away the ability of project managers to act swiftly to RFI’s or to 
integrate fully with contracted Design-Build firms. 
Additionally, inefficiencies within the study were therefore attributed to the mindset 
of the project manager and the organizational dynamic within the PDT. Conservatism can 
often dominate the mindset of many project managers, which can make them act in a risk-
adverse fashion. MILCON Transformation was meant to underwrite that aversion and give 
project managers the freedom to find innovative solutions to delivery projects at lower cost 
and time. However, if leadership is uncomfortable with the dynamic of underwriting 
measured risk, the project managers will not feel approval to innovate when a conservative 
attitude still exists. DB offered a great chance to meet the goals of MILCON 
Transformation, however individual lack of experience and confidence tended to make 
project managers shy of fully embracing Design-Build firms suggestions for USACE 
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performance specifications. In short, the unknown was a perceived risk, and in a 
conservative mindset, it is an unmitigated risk not worth taking. 
5.3 Limitations 
While the South Atlantic Division represents one of the largest Divisions in USACE, 
it is not necessarily representative of the entirety of USACE and it’s performance 
throughout the MILCON Transformation period. Every Division and District has their own 
dynamic of owners/users, A/E firms and building contractors, which can impact the type 
of project delivery method used as well as project cost and time metrics.  
The breadth of the focus group was also a limitation in this study. While the input of 
three USACE employees input is extremely valuable, it is hardly indicative of USACE as 
a whole. USACE is a highly complex organization with different organizational cultures 
within each district’s divisions. MILCON Transformation affected each district’s project 
performance metrics differently, indicating that there are differences in project 
management as well as organizational teamwork.  
Risk of discrepancies due to data misclassification is present due to the data input 
into the AIS being out of the researchers control. Despite careful efforts to filter projects 
through the necessary criteria, there is still a possibility that personnel responsible for data 
entry misclassified project data upon its entry into RMS or P2. Future studies should allow 
for time to conduct this verification through FedBizOops or District-level RMS databases 
to ensure that data pulled is an accurate representation of a districts project portfolio. 
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5.4 Future Research 
5.4.1 Corps-wide Study 
The limits of this study impacted the ability to completely evaluate the effect of 
MILCON Transformation on USACE. The South Atlantic Division, while one of the 
largest Divisions within USACE, cannot be considered as an accurate indicator of how 
well USACE executed MILCON Transformation across the entirety of USACE. The South 
Atlantic Divisions project performance data points to the need to conduct a wider, Corps-
level evaluation of MILCON Transformation. For future research, a wider data set needs 
to be captured in order to measure a more thorough and accurate impact of MILCON 
Transformation throughout USACE. Through this research, patterns can begin to be 
established to see which type of building will be more conducive to MILCON 
Transformation effects. 
5.4.2 Quality measurements 
This study did not consider a projects quality standards. Quality can be measured a 
variety of ways, either through maintenance reports from INCOM, Operations and 
Maintenance expenditure for MILCON construction, or a deep-dive into specifications for 
individual projects. As pointed out by the focus group, there was much debate over the 
cheapening of materials due to the use of DB, which caused USACE to demand more 
prescriptive specifications for their projects after the DB performance specifications 
yielded unsatisfactory quality measures.  
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5.4.3 Qualitative Analysis 
The use of a focus group was incredibly beneficial to gain insight into the inner-
workings of USACE and offer explanations for data analysis results. However, with a 
group of 3, this is hardly indicative of the entire South Atlantic Division. Additionally, the 
focus group offered no direct comments about the time performance metrics. Therefore, 
future study must include survey questions directed at the specific issue to garner 
professional opinion and further insight. Surveys need to be focused on a diverse 
professional section of employees. This means input needs to be gathered from employees  
across the project management, construction, engineering and contracting divisions 
amongst all the districts. Feedback will offer insight into the culture and business dynamic 
of each district within the South Atlantic Division.  
5.5 Conclusions 
Literature showed that the key to successful DB delivery is heavy owner involvement 
during the design phase. Focus group comments as well as Brigadier General Merdith 
Temple comments about maintaining a staff capable of handling FY-2000 project amounts 
to deal with the sudden influx of projects that FY 2006-2010 saw seemed to inhibit the 
ability of USACE to completely maximize the potential of DB. Staffing limitations that 
occurred during increased workload could have limited the effectiveness of MILCON 
Transformation in some Districts. Furthermore, looking at the triad of cost, schedule and 
quality, it is common saying in the construction industry that you can only have two of the 
three elements of the triad. USACE believes that it can achieve all three through the use to 
specific and diligent processes, however this dedication to process-delivery ends up 
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becoming a double-edged sword. The time it takes to run through all the processes, obtain 
approvals for change and get final decisions made ends up increasing the schedule time 
that would have otherwise been saved. 
Adapt-Build is a great adaption of the Design-Build authorization in the FAR, 
however it can turn into an issue for USACE when in the hands of risk-adverse project 
managers. Project Managers are told to “get it in the RFP before you advertise or pay for 
it in modifications later” (Project, 2010) which could warn managers to become more 
prescriptive in a performance-intended delivery method. This could shift more risk to the 
contractors than intended, therefore forcing costs to go up instead of truly finding value in 
innovation and pre-manufacturing.  
This could explain the dynamic of cost and time throughout the study. The 15% goal 
of cost savings, while realized on the whole for the South Atlantic Division, was not evenly 
contributed to throughout the Districts. The 30% goal of schedule reduction, was not 
achieved, although some tests did validate certain nominal reductions in time for the DB 
delivery method. MILCON Transformation can be thought of as a partial success by 
USACE, although it can be argued that the intent was actually met. Given the conditions 
of the USACE working environment and it’s handling of BRAC, GWOT and Army 
restructuring, due diligence was given to the enduring goal of being fiscally responsible 
with taxpayer money by using DB as the primary business model for MILCON 
Transformation. 
Literature indicated that USACE had the tendency to push too much risk onto the 
Design-Builder and did not fully immerse themselves into the design process (Blomberg, 
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2014). Focus group input further validated Blomberg’s study by indicating that PDT 
members were stretched with numerous projects of many different types and sizes. The 
data analyzed quantified this dynamic and showed that it had an adverse impact on the 
project performance metrics. Prioritized by their Chiefs rather than the project managers 
they work for, it can be seen that in some cases, design reviews can be completed in a 
manner that is time inefficient.   
5.6 Recommendations 
Results of the study point to several successful trends of the use of Design-Build and 
the USACE’s implementation of MILCON Transformation. To assist in the continuing 
effort of maximizing efficiency through process improvement, the following 
recommendations are given for consideration. 
• Sustain the use of Centers of Standardization and the use of the Model RFP. 
Results given the use of model RFP’s for the Administrative building type 
showed validated cost and time savings. The DB process is more efficient for 
the Administrative building type, and should be continued to promote further 
refinement to the model RFP. 
• Initial guidance for the use of Adapt-Build was to focus on refining the model 
RFP until ideal prescriptive specifications were derived from contractor input 
over time and many projects. Continue to allow Design-Build contractors to 
innovate and update specifications by keeping the Model RFP oriented on 
performance specifications.  
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• Relax the use of prescriptive specifications within DB projects. Use the After-
Action Reviews to identify quality measures that are most important with the 
owner/user and the USACE and detail those specifications only. This will 
translate to greater success with DB within building types that showed equal 
performance values between DB and DBB. Key to achieving this success is to 
modulate risk through Commanders underwriting certain oversights. Mistakes 
are commonly made even in processes that are repeated multiple times and have 
a high degree of comfort. Leaders still provide oversight to prevent gross-
negligence but at the same time encourage project managers and PDT members 
to innovate and try methods that aren’t commonly used in an effort to find more 
efficiency. Promoting a mindset of commitment to optimizing project 
efficiency instead of enforcing a “by the book” mentality will free employees 
up to continually improve. 
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APPENDIX A. MILCON FUNDING CODES USED 
 The following is a complete list of the funding codes that were used to identify 
MILCON projects. Projects are generally funded with either MILCON appropriations from 
Congress or from Operations and Maintenance funds. Construction that is over $750,000 
is considered to need MILCON funding.  
Table 16: MILCON Fund Codes (Dictionary, 2010) 
Military Programs Type Funds Codes 
Code Number Abbreviation Code Number Abbreviation 
2 BCA1 66 SAH 
3 BCF1 67 MCDIA 
4 BCD1 68 NGA 
6 MMCR 69 NSA 
7 BCA2 70 FMS 
8 BCF2 83 RDTA 
9 BCD2 84 RDAF 
10 MCA 85 RDTD 
10T TMCA 98 DECA 
11 MMCA 98T TDECA 
12 MCAR 0A BCA3 
12T TMCAR 0B BCF3 
13 MAP 0C BCA4 
15 PBS 0D BCF4 
16 ANC 0F BCA05 
17 MCNG 0G BCF05 
20 MCAF 0H BCD05 
20T TMCAF 0I BCN05 
21 MAFR 1A ECIP 
21T TMAFR 1AT TECIP 
22 MAPF 1B ECIF 
23 MMAF 1BT TECIP 
25 MANG 1E OECIP 
26 FHAF 1ET TOECIP 
26T TFHAF 1K KWM 
30 MCN 1N NWM 
32 NMCR 1P PRP 
34 MCARN 1S SOCM 
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36 PRIP 1U DERF 
39 MDOD 2B AFRM 
40 FHNC 2L AFLI 
40T TFHNC 2LT TAFLI 
41 DFAS 2S AFSM 
42 FHLI 3J GOJC 
42T TFHLI 3K ROKC 
43 DODU 3Q GOQC 
44 FHEC 4A MCDA 
44T TFHEC 4B MDAM 
46 DODM 4D MDAMM 
46T TDODM 4F MDAR 
51 DODEA 4H HAC 
52 NATO 4S SOF 
53 CEETA 4T CTR 
54 DLA 5N AFN 
56 DMA 5S S6S 
57 N(DTRA) 6A HN 
58 DISA 6C CDIP 
61 DFIRA 6E SACO 
62 FRGA EA MCCA 
63 PIKA EB MCCAF 
64 AFES EC IGF 
IR IRRF ED CERP 
Z1 MOSF EF TAEF 




APPENDIX B. DATA ELEMENTS 
 Appendix B outlies all the data points pulled directly from EDW. In some cases, 
certain data points were calculated using the formula’s shown for the data point.  
District 
 This data point labeled the District that was in charge of the project. The districts 
that had projects used in the study were SAS (Savannah), SAM (Mobile), SAC 
(Charleston) and SAW (Wilmington) 
Project Number 
 This data point pulled directly from EDW is the P2 number associated with the 
project. In some cases, projects were incrementally funded and had several P2 numbers 
associated with the single project. In order to identify these circumstances, projects were 
verified within RMS. RMS identified all applicable P2 numbers for an individual project.  
Program Year 
 This data point pulled directly from EDW indicated what year a project was 
initiated. 
BRAC Identifier 
 This data point labeled the District that was in charge of the project. The Districts 
that had  projects used in the study were SAS (Savannah), SAM (Mobile), SAC 
(Charleston) and SAW (Wilmington) 
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Type of Building 
 This data point pulled directly from EDW indicated what kind of building was 
being constructed.  
Location 
 This data point indicated what military base the project was being constructed. 
Design By 
 This data point is covered in Chapter 3.2.2.2. 
Original Contract Cost 
 This data point pulled directly from EDW the contract cost when the project came 
back from bid. It is in the dollar amount of it’s program year. 
Original Adjusted Contract Cost 
 This data point was manually calculated in order to set all program year dollars to 
2006 so that they can be accurately compared. The calculation for the Original Adjusted 








Options Exercised Amount 
 This data point pulled directly from EDW the options exercised at the time a 
contract is signed. Options are additional design and/or construction needs that the 
government will either confirm or reject prior to contract being signed. This is in addition 
to the original contract cost.  
Options Exercised Adjusted Amount 
 This data point was manually calculated in order to set all program year dollars to 
2006 so that they can be accurately compared. The calculation for the Options Exercised 
Adjusted Amount is as follows: 
𝑂𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠	𝐸𝑥𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑖𝑠𝑒𝑑	𝐴𝑗𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑑 =
2006	𝐶𝑃𝐼
𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑚	𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟	𝐶𝑃𝐼 ∗ 𝑂𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠	𝐸𝑥𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑖𝑠𝑒𝑑	𝐴𝑚𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡 
Original Contract with Options 
 This data point was manually calculated in order to calculate the complete original 
contract cost that includes options. The calculation for the Original Contract with Options 
is as follows: 
𝑂𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠	𝐸𝑥𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑖𝑠𝑒𝑑	𝐴𝑑𝑗𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑑
= 𝑂𝑟𝑖𝑔𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑙	𝐴𝑑𝑗𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑑	𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡 + 𝑂𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠	𝐸𝑥𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑖𝑠𝑒𝑑	𝐴𝑑𝑗𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑑 
Final Contract Cost 
 This data point pulled directly from EDW the contract cost when the project was 
completed. It is in the dollar amount of it’s program year. 
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Final Adjusted Contract Cost 
 This data point was manually calculated in order to set all program year dollars to 
2006 so that they can be accurately compared. The calculation for the Final Adjusted 
Contract Cost is as follows:  
𝐹𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑙	𝐴𝑑𝑗𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑑	𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡	𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡 =
2006	𝐶𝑃𝐼
𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑚	𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟	𝐶𝑃𝐼 ∗ 𝐹𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑙	𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡	𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡 
Cost Growth without Options 
 This data point was manually calculated in order to find the cost growth of the 






Cost Growth with Options 
 This data point was manually calculated in order to find the cost growth of the 









 This is data is manually input and is labeled based off the dollar size of the Final 
Contract Cost. The categories are listed in Chapter 3.2.3. 
Controllable Change Amount 
 This is data is pulled directly from EDW and is the total dollar amount (program 
year) of a projects controllable change. Controllable changes are listed as the following in 
RMS: 
• 1 -- Engineering Changes (Includes possible and confirmed A-E Fault)  
• 8 -- Value Engineering Changes 
• G -- Deficient Government Furnished Property Corrections  
• S -- Suspension of Work  
• T -- Termination of Work  
• V -- Construction Changes Necessary to Complete Contract (RMS, 2.36)  
Controllable Change Adjusted  
 This data point was manually calculated in order to set all program year dollars to 
2006 so that they can be accurately compared. The calculation for the Controllable Change 
Adjusted is as follows:  
𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒	𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒	𝐴𝑑𝑗𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑑 =
2006	𝐶𝑃𝐼
𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑚	𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟	𝐶𝑃𝐼 ∗ 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒	𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒 
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Controllable Change Duration (Days) 
 This is data is pulled directly from EDW and is expressed in calendar days. 
Final Change Amount 
 This is data is pulled directly from EDW and is the total dollar amount (program 
year) of a projects final change. Final changes are all a project’s uncontrollable and 
controllable changes together. 
Final Change Adjusted  
 This data point was manually calculated in order to set all program year dollars to 
2006 so that they can be accurately compared. The calculation for the Final Change 
Adjusted is as follows:  
𝐹𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑙	𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒	𝐴𝑑𝑗𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑑 =
2006	𝐶𝑃𝐼
𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑚	𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟	𝐶𝑃𝐼 ∗ 𝐹𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑙	𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒 
Final Change Duration (Days) 
 This is data is pulled directly from EDW and is expressed in calendar days. It is a 
combination of all a project’s uncontrollable and controllable changes. 
Original Contract Time (Days) 
 This is data is pulled directly from EDW and is expressed in calendar days. It is the 
originally agreed upon length of time a project will take to finish construction. 
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Options Exercised Time (Days) 
 This data point pulled directly from EDW the options exercised at the time a 
contract is signed and is expressed in calendar days. Options are additional design and/or 
construction needs that the government will either confirm or reject prior to contract being 
signed. This is in addition to the original contract time. 
Original Contract Time with Options 
 This data point was manually calculated in order to calculate the complete original 
contract duration that includes options. The calculation for the Original Contract Time with 
Options is as follows: 
𝑂𝑟𝑖𝑔𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑙	𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡	𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒	𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ	𝑂𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠
= 𝑂𝑟𝑖𝑔𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑙	𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡	𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒 + 𝑂𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠	𝐸𝑥𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑖𝑠𝑒𝑑	𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒 
Final Contract Time (Days) 
 This is data is pulled directly from EDW and is expressed in calendar days. It is the 
total amount of time a project took to finish construction. 
Contract Time Overage with Options 
 This data point was manually calculated in order to calculate the amount of days 
over the original contract time a project went over schedule that includes options. The 
calculation for the Contract Time Overage with Options is as follows: 
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𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡	𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒	𝑂𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒	𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ	𝑂𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠
= 𝐹𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑙	𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡	𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒 − 𝑂𝑟𝑖𝑔𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑙	𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡	𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒	𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ	𝑂𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠 
Contract Time Growth Percentage with Options 
 This data point was manually calculated in order to calculate the additional time a 
project went over schedule. The calculation for the Contract Time Growth Percentage with 




𝑂𝑟𝑖𝑔𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑙	𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡	𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒	𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ	𝑂𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠 ∗ 100  
BoD Original (Days) 
 This is data is pulled directly from EDW and is expressed by a calendar date. It is 
the original contracted date that troops are expected to occupy a building. 
BoD Actual (Days) 
 This is data is pulled directly from EDW and is expressed by a calendar date. It is 
the actual date that troops occupied a building 
BoD Growth (Days) 
 This data point was manually calculated in order to calculate the amount of days 
over the BoD original time a project went. The calculation for BoD Growth is as follows: 
𝐵𝑜𝐷	𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ = 𝐵𝑜𝐷	𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑢𝑎𝑙 − 𝐵𝑜𝐷	𝑂𝑟𝑖𝑔𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑙 
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BoD Growth (Percentage) 
 This is data is pulled directly from EDW and is the percentage of time a project 
comes above or below the BoD Original date. 
Placement (Gransberg, 2002) 
 Placement is a metric that has been in use by USACE for many years in order to 
numerically articulate efficiency (Gransberg, 2002). High values in placement indicate 






    
 106 
REFERENCES 
112th Congress. (2011). “Report of the committee on armed services house of 
representatives on H.R. 1540 together with additional views.” Rep. No. 112-78, U.S. 
Government Printing Office, Washington, DC. 
 
“Army Regulation 415-15, Army Military Construction Program Development and 
Execution.” Headquarters, Department of the Army. Washington, D.C. September 4, 
1998. 
 
Beard, Jeffrey L., Loulakis, Michael C., and Wundram, Edward C. (2001) Design Build: 
Planning through Development. McGraw Hill Publishers. Boston, Massachusetts. 
 
Blomberg, D., Cotellesso, P., Sitzabee, W., and Thal, A. E. (2014). “Discovery of Internal 
and External Factors Causing Military Construction Cost Premiums.” Journal of 
Construction Engineering and Management, 140(3), 4013060. 
Boslaugh, S. (2012). Statistics in a Nutshell (2nd Editio). Sebastopol: O’Reilly. 
Brennan, M. D. (2011). “Integrated project delivery: a normative model for value 
creation in complex military medical projects.” 
 
Burgess, Carmen L. (2006) “SecArmy Orders Army-Wide Business Transformation.” 
Army News Service, March 7, 2006. Washington DC. 
 
Charles, Michael. (1996) “Congress Approves New Design-Build Law.” Civil 
Engineering 66(33). 
 
CMAA. (2012). “An Owner’s Guide To Project Delivery Methods.” CMAA. 
 
DBIA. (n.d.). “What is Design-Build?” <https://www.dbia.org/about/Pages/What-is-
Design-Build.aspx> (Mar. 28, 2017). 
 
Dobbin, F. (1994). Forging Industrial Policy: The United States, Britain, and France in 
the Railway Age. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. 
 
 107 
“Engineering and Construction Bulletin No. 2005-7.” (2005) US Army Corps of 
Engineers, Washington D.C. May 19, 2005. 
 
Engineer Inspector General. (2010). Inspection of MILCON Transformation. Washington 
D.C. 
 
“Engineer Regulation 1180-1-9, Design-Build Contracting.” Department of the Army, US 
Army Corps of Engineers. Washington, D.C. July 31, 1999. 
 
“Experiences of Federal Agencies with the Design-Build Approach to Construction.” 
Federal Construction Council Consulting Committee on Cost Engineering. National 
Academy Press. Washington, D.C. 1993. 
 
Ewing, P. L., Tarantino, W., and Parnell, G. S. (2006). “Use of Decision Analysis in the 
Army Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) 2005 Military Value Analysis.” Decision 
Analysis, 3(1), 33–49. 
 
Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR). 
http://www.acquisition.gov/far/current/html/Subpart%2036_1.html#wp1076344, viewed 
March 12, 2017. 
 
Flyvbjerg, Bent; Holm, Mette Skamris; and Buhl Soren. (2002) “Underestimating Costs 
in Public Works Projects: Error or Lie?” Journal of the American Planning Association, 
American Planning Association. 68(3). 279-295. 
 
Garner, B., Richardson, K., and Castro-Lacouture, D. (2008). “Design-Build Project 
Delivery in Military Construction: Approach to Best Value Procurement,” Journal for the 
Advancement of Performance Information and Value, 1(1), 33-47. 
http://cibw117.com/journal/index.php/performance-info-and-value/article/view/46 
Gordon, Christopher M. (1994) “Choosing Appropriate Construction Contracting 
Method.” Journal of Construction Engineering, ASCE. 120(1). 196-210.  
 
Gransberg, Douglas, and Buitrago, V. (2002). “Construction project performance 
metrics.” AACE International Transactions. 
 
 108 
GSA. (2012). “The Competition in Contracting Act (CICA) | Interact.” GSA Interact, 
<https://interact.gsa.gov/blog/competition-contracting-act-cica> (Mar. 26, 2017). 
 
Hale, D. R., Shrestha, P. P., Asce, M., Gibson, G. E., Asce, F., & Migliaccio, G. C. 
(2009). Empirical Comparison of Design/Build and Design/Bid/Build Project 
Delivery Methods. https://doi.org/10.1061/͑ASCE͒CO.1943-7862.0000017 
“Inflation and Real Growth Handbook.” Army Budget Office, Budget Formulation 
Division. Washington D.C. April 2002. 
Konchar, Mark, and Sanvido, Victor. (1998) "Comparison of U.S. Project Delivery 
Systems." Journal of Construction Engineering and Management. ASCE, 124(6), 435-
444. 
 
Loulakis, M. C. (2003). Design-build for the public sector. Aspen Publishers Online. 
 
Mcwhirt, D. D. (2007). “A comparison of design-bid-build and design-build project 
delivery methods on military construction projects.” Ph.D. Dissertation, Iowa State 
University. 
 
“Model Request for Proposal for Medical Design-Build (D-B) Projects – DRAFT 
COPY.” (2006) Department of Defense, Project Number: W912HN-05-D-003. March 14, 
2006. 
 
Miller, Irwin and Freund, John E. (1977). Probability and Statistics for Engineers. 
Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc. 
 
Molenaar, Keith R., and Songer, Anthony D. (1998) “Model for Public Sector Design-
Build Project Selection.” Journal of Construction Engineering and Management, ASCE. 
124(6). 467-479. 
 
Molenaar, K. R., Songer, A. D., and Barash, M. (1999). “PUBLIC-SECTOR 
DESIGN/BUILD EVOLUTION AND PERFORMANCE.” JOURNAL OF 
MANAGEMENT IN ENGINEERING / MARCH, 54. 
 
Pietroforte, R., and Miller, J. B. (2002). “Procurement methods for US infrastructure: 




Pope, A. D. (1990). “The military construction (MILCON) program and privatization: A 
comparative analysis.” Air Force Institute of Technology, Wright-Patterson AFB, OH. 
Project Management - Military Programs. (2010). Huntsville: United States Corps of 
Engineers. 
Richardson, K. (2009). “Design Build Project Delivery in the Air Force Reserve 
Command.” MS Thesis, Georgia Institute of Technology. 
 
Riley, David R., Diller, Brenton E., and Kerr, Daniel. (2004) “Effects of Delivery 
Systems on Change Order Size and Frequency in Mechanical Construction.” Journal of 
Construction Engineering and Management, ASCE. 131(9). 953-962. 
 
“RMS Users Guide – Software Version 2.36.” US Army Corps of Engineers, RMS 
Center. http://216.86.193.60/guides.aspx viewed June 5, 2017 
Rosner, J. W., Thal, A. E., & West, C. J. (n.d.). Analysis of the Design-Build Delivery 
Method in Air Force Construction Projects. https://doi.org/10.1061/͑ASCE͒CO.1943-
7862.0000029 
Roth, M. (1995). “An Empirical Analysis of United States Navy Design/Build 
Contracts.” University of Texas. 
 
Setzer, S.W. (1992). “Design-Build job stokes tempers” Engineering News-Record, 229, 
8. 
 
Smith, J. (1986). “$37 screws, a $7,622 coffee maker, $640 toilet seats; Suppliers to our 
military just won’t be oversold.” Los Angeles Times, Los Angeles. 
 
Stone, C. (2012). “The Brooks Act at 40: A Law that Works | ASCE News.” ASCE News. 
 
Temple, Meredith W.B. “MILCON Transformation Update.” Presentation to the Garrison 
Commanders Conference. October 31, 2006. 
 
Tyler, J. Joseph. “MILCON Process Reinvention and MILCON Transformation” 
Presentation to the US Army Corps of Engineers. May 3, 2006. 
 
 110 
Uhlik, Felix T, and Eller, Michael D. (1999) “Alternative Deliver Approaches for Military 
Medical Construction Projects.” Journal of Architectural Engineering. ASCE 5(4). 149- 
155. 
 
Webster, A. (1997). “The Performance of the Design-Build Alternative Delivery 
Approach in Military Construction.” MS Thesis, University of Illinois at Urbana-
Champaign. 
 
Westcott, M. (2017). The Effect of MILCON Transformation on Savannah District 
Barracks. Atlanta. 
 
 
